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TAX TREATY ABUSE AND THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE 
TEST—PART 1
David G. Duff**
The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting came into force on July 1, 2018, and has been signed 
by more than 80 jurisdictions, including Canada. This multilateral instrument (MLI) has 
been described as “an historical turning point in the area of international taxation”; it 
introduces a third layer of rules for the taxation of cross-border transactions, in addition 
to domestic tax law and bilateral tax treaties. Of the many provisions of the MLI, the most 
important are the preamble text in article 6(1) and the general anti-avoidance provision—
the so-called principal purpose test (PPT)—in article 7(1). Both of these provisions 
have been adopted by all signatories to the MLI in order to satisfy the OECD’s minimum 
standard on tax treaty abuse under BEPS action 6. This two-part article considers the 
structure and potential application of the PPT in the context of pre-BEPS responses to 
perceived tax treaty abuses, the OECD’s work on BEPS action 6, and other provisions of 
the MLI, including the preamble text in article 6(1). The first part of the article reviews 
pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, providing necessary background and 
context for understanding BEPS action 6, the MLI, and the PPT. The second part examines 
the PPT in light of this background and in the context of BEPS action 6 and other provisions 
of the MLI, considering the structure of this provision and the kinds of transactions or 
arrangements to which it might apply.
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INTRODUCTION
The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Pre-
vent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting1 has been described as “an historical turning 
point in the area of international taxation”2 in that it introduces a third layer of rules 
for the taxation of cross-border transactions, in addition to domestic tax law and 
bilateral tax treaties. Developed, as the title suggests, to facilitate the implementation 
of tax treaty measures proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) as part of its project on base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS),3 this multilateral instrument (MLI) is designed to modify specific provisions 
of covered tax agreements (CTAs) that are designated by contracting jurisdictions to 
those agreements.4
 1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Convention To 
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, released 
on November 24, 2016 (www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax 
-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.pdf ) (herein referred to as “the MLI”).
 2 Robert J. Danon and Hugues Salomé, “The BEPS Multilateral Instrument: General Overview 
and Focus on Treaty Abuse” [2017] no. 3 IFF Forum für Steuerrecht 197-247, at 199.
 3 The proposed treaty-based measures were developed in BEPS action 2 (neutralizing the effect 
of hybrid mismatch arrangements), action 6 (preventing the granting of treaty benefits in 
inappropriate circumstances), action 7 (preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent 
establishment status), and action 14 (making dispute resolution mechanisms more effective), 
and appear in part II (articles 3 through 5), part III (articles 6 through 11), part IV (articles 12 
through 15), and part V (articles 16 and 17) of the MLI. Part I of the MLI (articles 1 and 2) 
addresses the scope of the convention and the interpretation of terms; part VII (articles 27 
through 39) deals with matters such as signature, ratification, entry into force, and withdrawal; 
and part VI (articles 18 through 26) contains measures for binding arbitration that emerged in 
the process of developing the MLI.
 4 The MLI applies to a tax treaty only where all parties to the treaty are signatories to the MLI 
and designate the treaty as a CTA. In addition, provisions of the MLI generally modify these 
tax treaties only where all parties to the CTA choose to apply the provision either by selecting 
an option afforded by the MLI or by not reserving the right for the provision not to apply. On 
the mechanics of the MLI and the positions taken by the initial signatories, see Danon and 
Salomé, supra note 2, at 200-13.
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The MLI has been signed, to date, by more than 80 jurisdictions, including Can-
ada,5 and came into force on July 1, 2018.6 Before the MLI can come into effect for a 
particular CTA, however, all contracting jurisdictions to the CTA must deposit their 
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD.7 As a result, al-
though the MLI will only modify CTAs selected by contracting jurisdictions and will 
not modify those CTAs until at least three months after all contracting states have 
deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD, 
the MLI will begin to modify the CTAs of some states beginning in 2019.8
Of the many provisions of the MLI, the most important are the preamble text in 
article 6(1) and the so-called principal purpose test (PPT) in article 7(1); both of 
these provisions have been adopted by all signatories to the MLI in order to satisfy 
the OECD’s minimum standard on tax treaty abuse under BEPS action 6.9 The pre-
amble text in article 6(1) applies in the place of or in the absence of preamble 
 5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Signatories and Parties to the 
Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting: Status as of 23 July 2018” (www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories 
-and-parties.pdf ).
 6 According to article 34(1) of the MLI, the convention shall enter into force on “the first day of 
the month following the expiration of a period of three calendar months beginning on the date 
of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.” Slovenia became the 
fifth jurisdiction to deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval, on March 22, 
2018 (joining Austria, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and Poland); accordingly, the MLI entered into 
force on July 1, 2018. For other signatories, article 34(2) of the MLI stipulates that the 
convention enters into force for each other signatory on the first day of the month after the 
expiration of three months from the date when the signatory deposited its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD.
 7 According to article 35(1) of the MLI, the convention comes into effect for non-resident 
withholding taxes on the first day of the next calendar year beginning on or after the latest of 
the dates on which the MLI comes into force for each of the contracting jurisdictions to the CTA, 
and otherwise generally for taxation years commencing six months after the latest of the dates 
on which the convention comes into force for each of the contracting jurisdictions to the CTA.
 8 Although Canada has signed the MLI, it has yet to ratify the convention. It has, however, 
tabled legislation to ratify the convention, and this legislation is likely to be approved by the 
end of 2018. See Canada, Department of Finance, “Canada Takes Next Step in Fight Against 
Aggressive International Tax Avoidance,” News Release, May 28, 2018 (www.fin.gc.ca/n18/ 
18-037-eng.asp). As a result, although it is uncertain whether Canada will deposit its 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD in time for the MLI to 
apply to non-resident withholding taxes in 2019, it can be expected to begin modifying at least 
some of Canada’s tax treaties as they apply to taxation years commencing later in 2019.
 9 According to the final report on BEPS action 6, countries must satisfy this minimum standard 
by amending bilateral tax treaties to include “an express statement that their common intention 
is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced 
taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty-shopping arrangements” 
and adopting either (1) a PPT, (2) a PPT and “a specific anti-abuse rule based on the limitation-
on-benefits provisions included in treaties concluded by the United States and a few other 
countries,” or (3) a limitation-on-benefits (LOB) provision and “a mechanism (such as a treaty 
rule that might take the form of a PPT rule restricted to conduit arrangements or domestic 
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language in a CTA, declaring that the CTA is intended to eliminate double taxation 
with respect to the taxes covered by the agreement “without creating opportunities 
for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including 
through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this 
agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).”10 The PPT in 
article 7(1) applies in place of or in the absence of principal purpose requirements 
in a CTA, and stipulates that
[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the 
Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital 
if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, 
that obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or 
transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established 
that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the 
object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.11
Based on a “guiding principle” in the commentary on the OECD model tax treaty,12 
and similar in structure to Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR),13 this pro-
vision adds a general anti-avoidance or anti-abuse rule to CTAs.
anti-abuse rules or judicial doctrines that would achieve a similar result) that would deal with 
conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.” Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, Action 6—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD, October 5, 2015) (herein referred to 
as “the final report on BEPS action 6”), at paragraphs 19 and 22 (www.oecd.org/tax/preventing 
-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report 
-9789264241695-en.htm). Of the 83 states that had signed the MLI as of July 23, 2018, 
62 indicated that they would adopt the PPT as a stand-alone anti-abuse provision; 13 indicated 
that they would adopt the PPT and the simplified LOB (SLOB) provisions in articles 7(8)-(13) 
of the MLI; and 8, including Canada, indicated that they would adopt the PPT alone as an 
interim measure while intending, where possible, to adopt LOB provisions in addition to or as 
a replacement for the PPT through bilateral negotiation. Figures compiled by the author from 
the positions of the signatories, available at OECD, supra note 5.
 10 MLI articles 6(1) and (2).
 11 MLI article 7(1).
 12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (Paris: OECD, November 2017) (herein referred to as 
“the OECD model convention”), at paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1, stating that 
“[a] guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to 
secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these 
circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions.” 
According to the commentary, this principle “applies independently” of the PPT in new 
article 29(9) of the OECD model convention, “which merely confirm[s] it” (ibid.).
 13 Section 245 of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended. Like the PPT, this 
provision applies to deny a tax benefit where three requirements are satisfied: (1) a transaction 
or a series of transactions of which the transaction is a part would otherwise result directly or 
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This two-part article considers the structure and potential application of the PPT 
in the context of pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, the OECD’s work 
on BEPS action 6, and other provisions of the MLI, including the preamble text in 
article 6(1). The first part, presented here, reviews pre-BEPS responses to perceived 
tax treaty abuses, providing necessary background and context for understanding 
BEPS action 6, the MLI, and the PPT. The second part (which will appear in a subse-
quent issue of this journal) examines the PPT in light of this background and in the 
context of BEPS action 6 and other provisions of the MLI, considering the structure 
of this general anti-abuse provision and the kinds of transactions or arrangements 
to which it might apply.
PRE-BEPS RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED 
TAX TREATY ABUSES
Although BEPS action 6 and the MLI represent major developments in the OECD’s 
efforts to prevent what it calls “the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate cir-
cumstances,”14 these initiatives cannot be properly understood in isolation, since 
they expand on pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, which the OECD 
and signatories to the MLI presumably consider to be inadequate or insufficient. 
The discussion that follows reviews these pre-BEPS responses to perceived treaty 
abuses, considering measures to address tax treaty shopping as well as other perceived 
abuses of tax treaties.
Ta x Treat y Shopping
Tax treaty shopping, broadly understood, has been defined as “a premeditated effort 
to take advantage of the international tax treaty network, and careful selection of 
the most favorable treaty for a specific purpose.”15 Since bilateral tax treaties apply 
only to residents of one or both of the contracting states,16 tax treaty shopping 
necessarily involves deliberate measures either to become a resident of a contract-
ing state in order to obtain treaty benefits that are available under one or more of 
indirectly in a tax benefit; (2) the transaction may not reasonably be considered to have been 
undertaken or arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain the tax benefit; 
and (3) it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would otherwise result in a misuse 
of provisions of the Income Tax Act or other relevant enactments or an abuse having regard to 
those provisions read as a whole.
 14 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 15.
 15 H. David Rosenbloom, “Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues” (1983) 15:3 Law and Policy in 
International Business 763-831, at 766. The final report on BEPS action 6 defines the concept of 
tax treaty shopping more narrowly, stating that these arrangements “typically involve persons 
who are residents of third States attempting to access indirectly the benefits of a treaty between 
two Contracting States.” Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 17. I return 
to this distinction later in this article, suggesting that the OECD’s emphasis on indirect access 
to treaty benefits by residents of third jurisdictions may support a possible distinction between 
abusive and non-abusive tax treaty shopping.
 16 Article 1 of the OECD model convention.
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its tax treaties with other states, or to access these treaty benefits indirectly by 
means of a legal entity that is resident in the contracting state. Examples include a 
tax-motivated change of residence shortly before the disposition of property in 
order to obtain a treaty exemption on the taxation of capital gains,17 and conduit 
arrangements whereby a resident of one state directs an investment through a legal 
entity in a third state in order to obtain treaty benefits under that state’s tax treaty 
with the ultimate source state.18
Objections to tax treaty shopping have traditionally emphasized its impact on the 
reciprocal “balance of sacrifices” accepted by each contracting state in negotiating 
a tax treaty.19 If a treaty can be accessed by residents of another state, the fairness of 
the treaty bargain may be undermined and the incentive for states to enter into tax 
treaties in the first place may be reduced.20 As the final report on BEPS action 6 
explains,
[a]llowing persons who are not directly entitled to treaty benefits (such as the reduc-
tion or elimination of withholding taxes on dividends, interest or royalties) to obtain 
these benefits indirectly through treaty shopping would frustrate the bilateral and 
reciprocal nature of tax treaties. If, for instance, a State knows that its residents can 
indirectly access the benefits of treaties concluded by another State, it may have little 
interest in granting reciprocal benefits to residents of that other State through the 
conclusion of a tax treaty.21
As the number of tax treaties has grown over the last several decades, increasing 
opportunities to take advantage of the tax treaty network to reduce or eliminate 
 17 See, for example, paragraph 56 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model 
convention (transfer of permanent home by an individual); and MIL Investments (SA) v. The 
Queen, 2006 TCC 460 (transfer of corporate residence).
 18 See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Double 
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies,” in International Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion: Four Related Studies, Issues in International Taxation no. 1 (Paris: OECD, 1987), 
87-106 (herein referred to as “the OECD conduit companies report”). For a useful discussion 
of conduit arrangements and tax treaty shopping, see Luc De Broe, International Tax Planning 
and Prevention of Abuse: A Study Under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in Relation to 
Conduit and Base Companies, IBFD Doctoral Series vol. 14 (Amsterdam: International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation, 2008). De Broe discusses (ibid., at 5-20) direct conduits in which a 
person who expects to derive dividends, interest, or royalties sourced in another state 
establishes an entity in a third state in order to access more advantageous treaty benefits in 
respect of the income, and “stepping-stone” structures in which the conduit is fully subject to 
tax in the third state but reduces its tax in that state through the deduction of interest, royalties, 
service fees, or other expenses paid either to the person in the residence state or to another 
entity controlled by that person.
 19 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at 90.
 20 Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 774-75.
 21 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 22. This text was subsequently incorporated 
into paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
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taxation, tax treaty shopping has also been challenged on the ground that it can 
produce unintended tax benefits resulting in reduced taxation or non-taxation.22 As 
the final report on BEPS action 6 states,
in such a case, the benefits that would be indirectly obtained may not be appropriate 
given the nature of the tax system of the former State [that is, the ultimate state of resi-
dence]; if, for instance, that State does not levy an income tax on a certain type of 
income, it would be inappropriate for its residents to benefit from the provisions of a 
tax treaty concluded between two other States that grant a reduction or elimination of 
source taxation for that type of income and that were designed on the assumption that 
the two Contracting States would tax such income.23
Before BEPS action 6 and the MLI, several jurisdictions adopted various domestic 
and treaty-based provisions to discourage tax treaty shopping, on which their tax 
authorities have relied with varying degrees of success. In order to discourage tax-
motivated emigration, for example, several jurisdictions impose exit or departure 
taxes that apply to accrued pension rights and/or capital gains.24 Other domestic 
anti-avoidance rules that may discourage tax-motivated expatriation include con-
trolled foreign corporation rules and non-resident trust provisions that attribute the 
income of non-resident legal entities to resident shareholders and beneficiaries.25
In order to discourage conduit arrangements, the United States adopted domestic 
anti-conduit regulations allowing the Internal Revenue Service to disregard an 
intermediate entity’s participation in a financing arrangement where one of the 
principal purposes of this participation is the avoidance of US withholding tax.26 For 
the same reason, Germany enacted an anti-treaty-shopping provision denying 
treaty benefits to a foreign company to the extent that the company’s shareholders 
would not be entitled to these benefits if they had received the income directly, 
 22 See, for example, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, United Nations 
document E/C.18/2006/2 (New York: United Nations, October 16, 2006), at paragraph 18 
(www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/documents/bgrd_model_ta.htm).
 23 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 22. This text was subsequently incorporated 
into paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
 24 These provisions are discussed in the final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 
paragraphs 65-67, and are mentioned in revised paragraph 69 of the commentary on article 1 
of the OECD model convention. Because Canada levies withholding tax on pension income 
under domestic law and tax treaties, it does not impose an exit tax on accrued pension rights; 
however, because Canada generally exempts capital gains from the alienation of property by 
non-residents, it imposes an exit tax on accrued capital gains under subsection 128.1(4) of the 
Income Tax Act.
 25 See, for example, sections 91 and 94 of the Income Tax Act. These provisions are discussed in 
the final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 59, and are incorporated into 
revised paragraph 81 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
 26 For a detailed discussion of these provisions and their potential application, see Peter M. Daub, 
“The Conduit Regulations Revisited” (2015) 147:4 Tax Notes 409-26.
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unless the income is derived from the company’s own economic activity or unless 
there are sound economic or other non-tax reasons for interposing the company 
and the company participates in general commerce through an appropriately 
equipped business establishment.27
Long before the development of these anti-conduit rules in the mid-1990s, 
Switzerland adopted a unilateral anti-abuse decree in 1962, which was designed, 
among other things, to protect treaty partners against the use of Swiss conduit 
arrangements by denying treaty benefits where more than 50 percent of treaty-
protected income was used to satisfy claims in third countries.28 More recently, 
Canada introduced domestic anti-conduit rules in 2014 addressing back-to-back 
loan arrangements, which were expanded in 2016 to include back-to-back royalty 
payments and shareholder loans, to include “character substitution rules” to prevent 
the avoidance of these rules through economically similar arrangements between an 
intermediary and another non-resident person, and to clarify that these rules apply 
to multiple-intermediary arrangements.29
In addition to these domestic specific anti-avoidance rules, tax authorities have 
challenged treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements under domestic anti-
avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance rules, on the basis that tax 
treaties are subject to an implicit general anti-abuse principle under international 
law, and on the ground that the recipient of income who would otherwise be eligible 
for treaty benefits is not its beneficial owner. As well, several jurisdictions have 
adopted specific anti-avoidance provisions in tax treaties, including limitation-on-
benefit (LOB) provisions that restrict treaty benefits to specific categories of 
 27 For brief discussions of this provision, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 419-23; and Andreas 
Kempf and Emma Moesle, “The Revised German Anti-Treaty Shopping Provisions—A 
Critical Review” (2012) 66:8 Bulletin for International Taxation 395-400. In two cases decided in 
2017, the European Court of Justice held that the original version of this anti-treaty-shopping 
regulation was incompatible with European Community law and the EC parent-subsidiary 
directive: C-504/16 (Deister Holding AG ) and C-613/16 ( Juhler Holding A/S ). The German 
Ministry of Finance has issued new guidance on the application of the revised provision in 
order to comply with these decisions.
 28 Bundesratsbeschluss betreffend Massnahmen gegen die ungerechfertigte Inanspruchnahme von 
Doppelbesteurungsabkommen des Bundes, December 14, 1962 (SR 672.202). For a brief 
description of this anti-abuse provision, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 440-41, explaining that 
the provision was adopted “in response to the risk of Switzerland being categorized as a tax 
haven by important industrialized countries (the United States in the first place), which would 
have had an adverse effect on the country’s ability to conclude tax treaties.” It is perhaps not 
coincidental that the decree was adopted around the time of the Johansson case, discussed below 
at notes 32-39 and the accompanying text, which involved a Swiss company claiming benefits 
under the Switzerland-US tax treaty.
 29 Subsections 212(3.1) through (3.94) and 15(2.16) through (2.192) of the Income Tax Act. For a 
useful overview of these rules, see Michael N. Kandev, “Canadian Interest Anti-Conduit Rule 
Soon To Be Law” (2014) 76:11 Tax Notes International 1027-30; and Michael N. Kandev, 
“Canada Expands Back-to-Back Regime: Examining the Character Substitution Rules” (2017) 
86:12 Tax Notes International 1087-92.
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residents or income and purpose tests that deny access to some or all treaty benefits 
where the main purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction or arrange-
ment was to obtain the treaty benefit. The following sections review each of these 
pre-BEPS responses to tax treaty shopping.
Domestic Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and General 
Anti-Avoidance Rules
Since the characterization of transactions or arrangements to which a tax treaty may 
apply generally depends on the domestic law of the contracting state from which a 
treaty benefit is sought, it is not surprising that tax treaty shopping might be chal-
lenged first under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and general anti-avoidance 
rules that determine the characterization of these transactions or arrangements.30 In 
the United States, for example, where courts have developed broad anti-avoidance 
doctrines in the form of business purpose and economic substance tests,31 at least 
three notable judicial decisions have applied these doctrines in order to deny treaty 
benefits that would otherwise have resulted from tax treaty shopping.
In Johansson v. United States,32 the taxpayer was a Swedish boxer who fought 
three world heavyweight championship fights in the United States against US boxer 
Floyd Patterson.33 After winning the first fight, Johansson obtained tax residence in 
Switzerland, where he incorporated a company with which he entered into an 
employment contract and from which he received substantial compensation for the 
second and third fights. He then argued that the compensation was exempt from US 
tax under article X(1) of the 1951 Switzerland-US tax treaty,34 according to which 
individuals resident in Switzerland were exempt from US tax on “compensation for 
labor or personal services performed in the United States” where the individual was 
“temporarily present in the United States for a period or periods not exceeding 183 
 30 Although it might be argued that these domestic anti-avoidance doctrines or general 
anti-avoidance rules conflict with tax treaties, it is also arguable that these doctrines and rules 
are compatible with tax treaties that apply to transactions or arrangements as determined under 
domestic tax law. The OECD commentaries have reflected the latter view since the adoption of 
revisions in 2003: paragraphs 73 and 76-80 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD 
model convention. In Canada, section 245 of the Income Tax Act (GAAR) was amended in 
2005 to explicitly apply to the misuse or abuse of provisions of a tax treaty, and section 4.1 of 
the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c. I-4, as amended, declares that 
Canada’s GAAR applies to “any benefit” provided under a tax treaty, notwithstanding the 
provisions of the treaty or legislation giving the treaty the force of law in Canada.
 31 See, for example, Gregory v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 US 465 (1935); 
Comm’r. v. Court Holding Co., 324 US 331 (1945); and Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 US 737 (1947).
 32 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
 33 Johansson won the first match on June 26, 1959, becoming the heavyweight champion of the 
world, but lost the second and third bouts on June 20, 1960 and March 13, 1961.
 34 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Washington, DC on 
May 24, 1951 (herein referred to as “the Switzerland-US tax treaty”).
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days” and the compensation was received for “labor or personal services performed 
as an employee of, or under contract with, a resident or corporation or other entity 
of Switzerland.”35
Observing that Johansson was the Swiss company’s “sole employee and sole 
source of revenue” and “conducted his affairs largely independent of” its sole director 
and stockholders,36 the Fifth Circuit court upheld the judgment of the District 
Court, which had held against the taxpayer on the basis that the company
had no legitimate business purpose, but was a device which was used by Ingemar 
Johansson as a controlled depositary and conduit by which he attempted to divert 
temporarily, his personal income, earned in the United States, so as to escape taxation 
thereon in the United States.37
In addition, the Fifth Circuit court continued, exemption would contradict “the 
genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties” and the “primary objective” 
of the treaty with Switzerland and other tax treaties to eliminate “impediments to 
international commerce resulting from the double taxation of international trans-
actions” by allocating tax jurisdiction to the “most appropriate locus for the taxation 
of any given transaction.”38 As a result, the court concluded:
[W]hile Johansson may have brought himself within the words of the Swiss treaty by 
his “residence” in Switzerland and his “employment” by a “Swiss corporation,” he has 
failed to establish any substantial reasons for deviating from the treaty’s basic rule that 
income from services is taxable where the services were rendered. International trade 
will not be seriously encumbered by our refusal to grant special tax treatment to one 
only marginally, if at all, a Swiss resident and only technically, if at all, employed by a 
paper Swiss corporation.39
 35 This provision is similar to article 15(2) of the OECD model convention, which exempts 
remuneration derived by a resident of a contracting state in respect of employment exercised in 
the other contracting state if the recipient is present in the other state for a period or periods 
not exceeding 183 days in any 12-month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year, and 
the remuneration is paid by or on behalf of an employer who is not a resident of the other 
state, and is not borne by a permanent establishment that the employer has in the other state. 
Although this provision is subject to article 17, which provides broader source jurisdiction for 
income derived as an entertainer or sportsperson and includes a specific anti-avoidance rule in 
article 17(2) for income that “accrues not to the entertainer or sportsperson but to another 
person,” the 1951 Switzerland-US tax treaty did not include comparable provisions.
 36 Johansson, supra note 32, at 813.
 37 Cited in Johansson, ibid. The court also concluded that Johansson was not a resident of 
Switzerland during the period in question, rejecting his argument that the United States was 
bound by a determination to the contrary by the Swiss tax authorities.
 38 Johansson, supra note 32, at 813.
 39 Ibid., at 814.
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Similarly, in Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,40 the US Tax Court relied on 
domestic anti-avoidance doctrines to deny treaty benefits that might otherwise have 
been available. In this case, the taxpayer borrowed funds from a company that was 
resident in the Bahamas (with which the United States did not have a tax treaty), 
which assigned the debt to a wholly owned subsidiary that it had incorporated in 
Honduras (with which the United States had entered into a tax treaty) in exchange 
for notes on which interest was payable at the same rate as the rate of interest pay-
able on the loan to the taxpayer. Concluding that the “only purpose” of the 
assignment was “to obtain the benefits of the exemption established by the treaty” 
and that the taxpayer had “failed to establish that a substantive indebtedness 
existed” between the taxpayer and the Honduran subsidiary,41 the court rejected the 
taxpayer’s argument that the interest payments were exempt from US withholding 
tax under article IX of the Honduras-US tax treaty,42 on the ground that the interest 
was not “received by” the Honduran subsidiary as required by the treaty.43 On the 
contrary, the court concluded, since the words “received by” contemplate “com-
plete dominion and control” over an amount without an “obligation to transmit” 
the amount to another person,44 the Honduran subsidiary was in effect “a collection 
agent with respect to the interest it received” from the taxpayer and a “conduit for 
the passage of interest payments” that “had no actual beneficial interest” in the 
funds and therefore “cannot be said to have received the interest as its own.”45
The outcome was again similar in Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue.46 In this case, the taxpayer, an indirect US subsidiary of a Canad-
ian company, borrowed funds from an indirect Dutch subsidiary of the Canadian 
company, which had obtained the funds through a series of “related and essentially 
simultaneous” loans and equity investments by upper-tier subsidiaries of the Can-
adian company.47 The US Tax Court held that interest payments on the borrowed 
 40 56 TC 925 (1971). For a useful discussion of this case, see Yariv Brauner, “Beneficial 
Ownership in and Outside US Tax Treaties,” in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, 
Claus Staringer, and Alfred Storck, eds., Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends (Amsterdam: 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2013), 143-60, at 146-49.
 41 Aiken Industries, supra note 40, at 934.
 42 Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Honduras for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, signed at Washington, DC on June 25, 1956.
 43 Aiken Industries, supra note 40, at 934.
 44 Ibid., at 933.
 45 Ibid.
 46 TC Memo 1999-411. For a useful discussion of this case, see Brauner, supra note 40, at 
155-58.
 47 Del Commercial Properties, supra note 46, at 2. The funds were originally borrowed by a 
Canadian company called Delcom Financial Ltd., a second-tier subsidiary of the affiliated group. 
Delcom Financial Ltd. loaned the funds to a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary called Delcom 
Holdings, which contributed the funds to a wholly owned company organized in the Cayman 
Islands, in exchange for common shares. The Cayman Islands company then contributed the 
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funds were subject to withholding tax under the Canada-US tax treaty48 and not 
exempt under the Netherlands-US tax treaty49 on the ground that the Dutch sub-
sidiary “had no purpose other than avoidance of withholding tax.”50 Emphasizing 
that the Dutch subsidiary “had minimal assets, . . . engaged in minimal business 
activity,” and “had only transitory possession of and no control over the . . . loan 
proceeds” that were conveyed to the taxpayer,51 and that loan payments that were 
received by the Dutch company were transferred directly to upper-tier Canadian 
subsidiaries in order to make payments on an original loan from the Royal Bank of 
Canada,52 the court held that the Dutch company “acted as a mere shell or conduit 
with respect to the interest payments” made by the taxpayer, which had “in substance” 
received the borrowed funds from and made the loan payments to the upper-tier 
Canadian subsidiary with which the series of transactions had commenced when it 
borrowed funds from the Royal Bank of Canada.53 On appeal, the DC Circuit court 
held that “the Tax Court did not clearly err in concluding that the payments from 
[the] appellant to [the Dutch company] were in substance payments made to [the 
upper-tier Canadian subsidiary] and that those payments only served to avoid U.S. 
taxes.”54
In other countries, where courts have not adopted broad business purpose or 
economic substance doctrines, tax-treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements 
may still be rejected under other judicially developed anti-avoidance doctrines or 
statutory general anti-avoidance rules. In Antle v. The Queen,55 for example, a resi-
dent of Canada purported to transfer shares of a Canadian company to a 
funds to a wholly owned company organized in the Netherlands Antilles, in exchange for 
common shares, and the Netherland Antilles company contributed the funds to a wholly 
owned company organized in the Netherlands, also in exchange for common shares.
 48 Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital, signed at Washington, DC on September 26, 1980, as amended by 
the protocols signed on June 14, 1983, March 28, 1984, March 17, 1995, and July 29, 1997 
(subsequently amended by a protocol signed on September 21, 2007) (herein referred to as 
“the Canada-US tax treaty”).
 49 Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, signed at Washington, DC on April 29, 
1948, as modified and supplemented by the Supplementary Convention signed at Washington, 
DC on December 30, 1965.
 50 Del Commercial Properties, supra note 46, at 12.
 51 Ibid.
 52 Ibid., at 7, adding that the taxpayer subsequently made payments directly to an upper-tier 
Canadian subsidiary, bypassing the Dutch company entirely.
 53 Ibid., at 12.
 54 Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. CIR, 251 F.3d 210, at 214 (DC Cir. 2001). For a critical 
comment on the appellate court’s reasons, see Peter A. Glicklich and Michael J. Miller, 
“Appeals Court Invalidates US-Netherlands ‘Double-Dip’ Financing Structure,” Selected US 
Tax Developments feature (2001) 49:4 Canadian Tax Journal 1076-84.
 55 2009 TCC 465.
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non-resident trust on a tax-deferred basis, and the trust claimed a treaty exemption 
on a capital gain resulting from a subsequent sale of the shares; however, the Tax 
Court of Canada held that the gain was properly attributable to the taxpayer on the 
grounds that the alleged trustee acted as an agent for the taxpayer and the trans-
actions had not established the legal relationship of a trust.56 In addition, the court 
continued, even if the transactions had established a trust, they would have abused 
domestic tax law and the tax treaty, and the Canadian GAAR would have applied to 
attribute the gain to the taxpayer.57 On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld 
the decision on the basis that the purported trust was a sham that did not reflect the 
real rights and obligations created by the taxpayer and the supposed trustee.58
Likewise, in Ministre de l’Économie v. Bank of Scotland,59 the French Conseil 
d’État relied on domestic anti-avoidance principles to deny a refundable tax credit 
(“l’avoir fiscal”) available under the France-UK tax treaty60 for dividends paid by a 
French company to a resident of the United Kingdom. In this case, the taxpayer, 
which was a resident of the United Kingdom, acquired preferred shares of a French 
company from its US parent under a usufruct agreement lasting for three years, for 
an amount that was slightly less than the cumulative amount of the dividends 
expected during the three years. Characterizing the usufruct agreement as an arti-
ficially concealed loan arrangement in which the US parent remained the true owner 
of the shares (which were pledged to the taxpayer as a guarantee for the loan), the 
court held that the US parent was the beneficial owner of the dividends and the 
provisions of the France-UK treaty did not apply. In addition, the court continued, 
because the arrangement was entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining abusively 
the benefit of the tax credit, the tax administration could recharacterize the disputed 
assignment contract as a loan.61
In contrast to these decisions, the courts in each of these countries have declined 
to apply domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance 
rules to other treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements. In Northern Indiana 
Public Service Corp. v. Commissioner,62 for example, a US company incorporated a 
 56 Ibid., at paragraphs 48 and 58, concluding that the trust “never came into existence.”
 57 Ibid., at paragraph 120, concluding that the transactions resulted in “an abuse of the Act, of the 
Treaty and of the joint operation of both.”
 58 2010 FCA 280. For this reason, the court did not consider it necessary to consider the possible 
application of GAAR.
 59 (2006), 9 ITLR 683 (Conseil d’État).
 60 Convention Between the Republic of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed on May 22, 1968 (herein referred to as “the 
France-UK tax treaty”).
 61 See the discussion of the case in De Broe, supra note 18, at 699-701.
 62 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997). For a useful discussion of this case, see Brauner, supra note 40, at 
149-51.
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subsidiary (“Finance”) in the Netherlands Antilles, which issued notes in the euro-
bond market at a rate of 17.25 percent and loaned these funds to the taxpayer at a 
rate of 18.25 percent. The Seventh Circuit court rejected the commissioner’s argu-
ment that Finance should be disregarded for tax purposes because the transactions 
were undertaken to avoid US withholding tax that would have been payable had the 
taxpayer itself issued notes in the eurobond market.63 Notwithstanding that the tax-
payer guaranteed all payments on the euronotes issued by Finance and that Finance 
was wound up less than a year after the back-to-back loans were repaid, the court 
held that the transactions were “recognizable for tax purposes, despite any tax-
avoidance motive” because Finance conducted “recognizable” though “concededly 
minimal” business activity, and the transactions resulted in “actual, non-tax-related 
changes” in its “economic position” since it earned a profit from the spread in inter-
est rates and reinvested profits.64 As a result, the court concluded, the arrangement 
“had economic substance” to both Finance and the taxpayer.65
Similarly, in SARL Foundation Industries France,66 where a French company paid 
royalties to a Dutch company, which distributed 93 percent to 98 percent of 
those royalties to another company resident in the Netherlands Antilles, the 
Administrative Tribunal of Lille rejected the argument of the French tax authorities 
that the Dutch company should be disregarded for the purposes of the withholding 
tax exemption under the France-Netherlands tax treaty.67 Although the terms of 
the licence agreements required the Dutch company to verify the accounts of the 
French sublicensee and convey this information to the Antillean company if 
requested, the court held that this evidence was not sufficient to conclude that the 
Dutch company was a mere financial agent for the Antillean company. As in North-
ern Indiana Public Service Corp., therefore, minimal business activity and an 
economic profit were sufficient for the Dutch company to be recognized for tax 
purposes.
Similar considerations entered into the Tax Court of Canada decision in MIL 
Investments (SA) v. The Queen.68 In this case, the taxpayer, which was a resident of the 
Cayman Islands and was wholly owned by an individual who was a resident of 
 63 Northern Indiana, supra note 62, at 511.
 64 Ibid., at 512-14.
 65 Ibid., at 514.
 66 (March 19, 1999), case nos. 95-5403 and 96-738, RJF 8-9/99 no. 961 (Admin. Trib. Lille). 
For brief discussions of this case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 697; and Daniel Gutmann, 
“Beneficial Ownership Without Specific Beneficial Ownership Provision,” in Beneficial 
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 161-66, at 165.
 67 Convention Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed on March 16, 1973 
(herein referred to as “the France-Netherlands tax treaty”).
 68 MIL Investments, supra note 17.
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Monaco, owned shares of a Canadian mining company called Diamond Field 
Resources (“DFR”), the value of which had increased substantially and was primarily 
attributable to immovable property situated in Canada. Before selling most of those 
shares, the taxpayer reduced its percentage interest in DFR to slightly less than 
10 percent and continued into Luxembourg, where the gain was exempt from 
domestic tax owing to a step-up in the cost of the shares. Although the gain was 
taxable in Canada under domestic law, the taxpayer claimed an exemption under 
article 13 of the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty; paragraph (4) of that article extends 
source taxation to gains from the alienation of shares deriving their value principally 
from immovable property situated in a state only where the shares form part of a 
“substantial interest” in the company, which the provision specifically defines as 
“10 per cent or more of the shares of any class.”69
Accepting the testimony of the taxpayer’s sole shareholder that he wanted “to get 
back to exploring and building mines in Africa”70 and the argument of the taxpayer’s 
counsel that “Luxembourg was a better jurisdiction than the Cayman Islands in 
which to carry on a mining business in Africa,”71 the Tax Court held that the Can-
adian GAAR did not apply because none of the transactions, including the 
continuation into Luxembourg, were avoidance transactions that were undertaken 
primarily to obtain a tax benefit.72 In addition, the court continued, even if one or 
more of the transactions had been primarily tax-motivated, GAAR would not apply 
because none of the transactions abused either the treaty as a whole or the specific 
provision on which the taxpayer relied. On the contrary, the court concluded, “the 
shopping or selection of a treaty to minimize tax on its own cannot be viewed as 
being abusive”73 and the taxpayer’s “reliance upon a Treaty provision as agreed upon 
by both Canada and Luxembourg cannot be viewed as being a misuse or abuse.”74
 69 Convention Between Canada and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, signed at Luxembourg on September 10, 1999 (herein referred to as “the Canada-
Luxembourg tax treaty”).
 70 MIL Investments, supra note 17, at paragraph 46.
 71 Ibid., at paragraph 49.
 72 Ibid., at paragraph 67.
 73 Ibid., at paragraph 72.
 74 Ibid., at paragraph 74, noting that the exemption in article 13(4) of the treaty was “not found in 
the OECD model convention upon which the Treaty is based” and concluding on this basis 
that “it must be presumed that Canada had a valid reason to allow Luxembourg to retain the 
right to tax capital gains in those specific circumstances, for example, the desire to encourage 
foreign investment in Canadian property.” The court also suggested that the circumstances 
would have been different had the taxpayer originally been a resident of Canada rather than the 
Cayman Islands, since emigration to Luxembourg would have triggered the exit tax under 
section 128.1 of the Income Tax Act, and article 13(6) of the treaty would have given Canada 
the right to tax any gains realized by former residents of Canada for six years. Ibid., at 
paragraph 75.
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On appeal, the taxpayer conceded that the continuation into Luxembourg was 
an avoidance transaction,75 but the Federal Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the 
decision on the ground that the Crown had failed to establish that the transactions 
were abusive. According to the court, it was “unable to find . . . an object or pur-
pose” behind the treaty provision that would justify the court’s “departure from the 
plain words” of the text.76 Nor was the court persuaded that “the Tax Treaty should 
not be interpreted so as to permit double non-taxation,” since “the issue raised by 
GAAR is the incidence of Canadian taxation, not the foregoing of revenues by the 
Luxembourg fiscal authorities.”77 Unlike the decision in Northern Indiana Public 
Service Corp., therefore, the appellate court decision in MIL Investments turned not 
on the existence of any bona fide business activity or economic substance in Luxem-
bourg, but on the Crown’s failure to demonstrate that admitted tax-motivated treaty 
shopping was contrary to the object and purpose of the Canada-Luxembourg tax 
treaty or the provision on which the taxpayer relied. As will be explained in the 
second part of this article, the object and purpose of a tax treaty or treaty provision 
are a key aspect of the PPT, the interpretation of which is apt to pose the greatest 
difficulty in the application of the test—though this interpretive exercise will now 
be guided by the amended preamble text and other provisions of the MLI as well as 
the OECD commentaries.
Implicit General Anti-Abuse Principle
Regardless of whether tax treaty shopping is disallowed under domestic anti-
avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance rules, some commentators 
and tax authorities have taken the position that such transactions or arrangements 
may be challenged on the basis of an implicit or inherent general anti-abuse prin-
ciple under international law. According to Klaus Vogel, such a principle may be 
derived from the pacta sunt servanda principle in article 26 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, according to which treaties are to be performed “in good 
faith.”78 Since this principle dictates that a contracting state “need not tolerate a 
circumvention of a treaty by the other contracting State,” Vogel maintains, “it 
would be absurd for it to be committed to tolerate circumvention by a private 
person and to apply the treaty in a strictly formal way notwithstanding such circum-
vention.”79 As a result, he concludes, tax treaties are “subject to a general 
 75 Canada v. MIL Investments (SA), 2007 FCA 236, at paragraph 3.
 76 Ibid., at paragraph 6. The court added, ibid., at paragraph 7, that “[i]f the object of the 
exempting provision was to be limited to portfolio investments, or to non-controlling interests 
in immoveable property . . . , it would have been easy enough to say so.”
 77 Ibid., at paragraph 8.
 78 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, UN doc. A/Conf. 
39/27, fourth annex, UNTS 1155/331.
 79 Klaus Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary to the OECD-, 
UN- and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital 
(Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1991), Introduction, at paragraph 121.
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‘substance v. form proviso’ based on international law,” which “restricts the treaty’s 
binding effect under international law and thus also its binding effect under domestic 
law, since only so much of a treaty’s contents can become domestic law as is applic-
able by virtue of international law.”80
Another argument for a general anti-abuse principle under international law 
looks to an alternative source of international law, namely, customary international 
law. According to David Ward,
[i]n light of the fact that the International Court of Justice has already given recogni-
tion to the principle of abuse of rights in interpreting treaties generally, that Article 26 
of the Vienna Convention requires parties to a treaty to perform the treaties in good 
faith, that the principle of abuse of rights has been incorporated in the Convention of 
the Law of the Sea and, more specifically in a tax context, that anti-abuse principles have 
developed judicially or have been enacted by statute in the internal law of a great 
number of countries (albeit with some differences in the frequency of application and 
in the formulation of the rules and in the labels applied to them), one can say that an 
anti-abuse rule in taxation matters is one of the “general principles recognized by civi-
lized nations.” (According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, general principles recognized by civilized nations constitute one of the sources 
of international law.)81
On this basis, Ward concurs with Vogel’s conclusion that “a general anti-abuse 
doctrine should be recognized by tax administrations and courts generally in inter-
preting and applying tax treaties.”82
A third rationale for an implicit anti-abuse principle turns not on the pacta sunt 
servanda principle nor on customary international law, but on general principles of 
treaty interpretation according to which a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith 
and in light of its object and purpose.83 On this basis, Frank Engelen concludes that 
there is “a sound legal basis” for the existence of a general anti-abuse principle in 
the interpretation of a tax treaty irrespective of any such provision in the text of the 
treaty.84 Luc De Broe arrives at a similar conclusion, suggesting that treaty benefits 
that might otherwise be claimed by a taxpayer under a tax treaty may be denied in 
circumstances where “the granting of such benefits would frustrate the treaty’s 
object and purpose.”85
 80 Ibid.
 81 Davies, Ward & Beck, Ward’s Tax Treaties 1996-1997 (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 61.
 82 Ibid.
 83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, at article 31(1).
 84 Frank A. Engelen, On Values and Norms: The Principle of Good Faith in the Law of Treaties and the 
Law of Tax Treaties in Particular (Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 
at 36.
 85 De Broe, supra note 18, at 316.
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Although the first of these arguments for an implicit anti-abuse principle under 
international law has been challenged on the basis that the pacta sunt servanda prin-
ciple applies only to contracting states, and not to taxpayers who are not themselves 
parties to tax treaties,86 and the second argument has been questioned on the 
ground that there is little international consensus on the existence of a general anti-
abuse principle absent specific treaty provisions to this effect,87 the third rationale 
for an implicit anti-abuse principle appears to have been more widely accepted.88 At 
the same time, since general principles of treaty interpretation also require treaties 
to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning,89 it is not obvious that these 
interpretive principles allow treaty benefits to be denied on the basis of an object or 
purpose that is not consistent with the text of the treaty and supported by other 
authoritative indications of the intentions of the contracting states.90 Indeed, since 
tax treaties have several purposes, some of which may be differently construed,91 
 86 See, for example, Stef van Weeghel, The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to 
the Netherlands and the United States (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), at 116; 
Nathalie Goyette, Countering Tax Treaty Abuses: A Canadian Perspective on an International Issue 
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999), at 10-12; and De Broe, supra note 18, at 302-8.
 87 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 308-16. As will be explained in the second part of 
this article, the PPT is clearly intended to establish and codify an international consensus on a 
general anti-abuse principle.
 88 See, for example, Stef van Weeghel and Anna Gunn, “A General Anti-Abuse Principle of 
International Law: Can It Be Applied in Tax Cases?” in Gugliemo Maisto, Angelo Nikolakakis, 
and John M. Ulmer, eds., Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward (Toronto: Canadian 
Tax Foundation and International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2013), 305-23, at 322, 
concurring with Engelen that “the requirement to grant treaty benefits in cases which are 
clearly abusive would be unreasonable.”
 89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, at article 31(1).
 90 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 308, emphasizing that a denial of treaty benefits 
based on principles of treaty interpretation must be “supported by the terms of the treaty.” 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, the ordinary 
meaning of a treaty is to be determined “in context” (article 31(1)), and this context
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; and
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty [article 31(2)].
It therefore follows that treaty interpretation may also take into account extrinsic materials 
such as explanatory memorandums jointly prepared by both contracting states or drafted by 
one state and approved by the other (for example, the technical explanation to the Canada-US 
tax treaty) as well as OECD commentaries existing at the time the treaty was concluded. 
De Broe, supra note 18, at 345. On the relevance of the OECD model convention and OECD 
commentaries to the interpretation of tax treaties, see Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Canada, 
[1995] 2 SCR 802.
 91 Although the primary purpose of a tax treaty is generally said to be the elimination of double 
taxation (accomplished through distributive provisions and the elimination-of-double-taxation 
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and since the object or purpose of many tax treaty provisions is not clearly stated in 
the text of the treaty or in explanatory memorandums and commentaries,92 the 
application of an implicit anti-abuse principle based on unstated objects and pur-
poses can be difficult and highly uncertain.93 For this reason, most commentators 
who have affirmed the existence of an implicit anti-abuse principle have insisted on a 
high threshold for its application,94 limiting its reach to “wholly artificial” transactions 
or arrangements that are entered into solely for the purpose of avoiding tax.95
provision), this purpose is arguably subordinate to a more general purpose of allocating taxing 
rights between the contracting states, which is itself subsidiary to an overriding purpose of 
reducing or eliminating tax barriers to cross-border economic activity. See, for example, 
De Broe, supra note 18, at 325-29. Other purposes of tax treaties include the prevention of 
fiscal evasion (accomplished through information exchange and assistance in the collection 
of taxes), non-discrimination, and the resolution of tax disputes through the mutual agreement 
procedure. Where the primary purpose of a tax treaty is construed as the elimination of double 
taxation, it is of course much easier to derive a corresponding purpose to prevent tax avoidance 
resulting in double non-taxation. As will be explained in the second part of this article, the revised 
preamble language in article 6(1) of the MLI is clearly intended to influence the interpretation 
of the PPT.
 92 See, for example, Richard Vann, “Beneficial Ownership: What Does History (and Maybe 
Policy) Tell Us,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 267-331, at 296, 
explaining that the OECD’s work on treaty abuse has been “bedeviled” by “the lack of a 
clear . . . elucidation of the policy (or rather policies . . .) underlying particular provisions in tax 
treaties”; and De Broe, supra note 18, at 344, stating that the distributive provisions of the 
OECD model convention are “drafted in general wording, in a sober and technical fashion”—
making the determination of their object and purpose “not an easy task.” In this respect, see 
the Federal Court of Appeal decision in MIL Investments, supra note 75, at paragraph 6, stating 
that the court was “unable to find . . . an object or purpose” behind article 13(4) of the 
Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty that would justify the court’s “departure from the plain words” 
of the text.
 93 See, for example, van Weeghel and Gunn, supra note 88, at 323, describing the application of 
an implicit anti-abuse principle as “rather arbitrary.” As will be explained in the second part of 
this article, a similar challenge exists with the “object and purpose” criterion of the PPT.
 94 See, for example, Klaus Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary 
to the OECD-, UN- and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and 
Capital, 3d ed. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), article 1, at paragraph 95, stating 
that “application of a double taxation convention in accordance with its substance rather than 
in accordance with its form should continue to be an exception and that the threshold for 
allowing such application should be fixed at a high level rather than a low one.” As will be 
discussed in the second part of this article, the threshold for the PPT is much lower, such that 
the test applies where “one of the principal purposes” of a transaction or arrangement was to 
obtain a treaty benefit.
 95 Engelen, supra note 84, at 36. See also van Weeghel, supra note 86, at 258, stating that the 
improper use of a tax treaty must have “the sole intention to avoid the tax of one or both 
contracting states and must defeat fundamental and enduring expectations and policy objectives 
shared by both states and therewith the purpose of a treaty in the broad sense”; and De Broe, 
supra note 18, at 320, arguing that because tax treaties provide specific tax benefits in order to 
encourage cross-border economic activities, “[i]t would be contrary to the object and purpose 
of a tax treaty if a transaction that has a reasonable business justification would be denied treaty 
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At the OECD, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs originally rejected the idea of an 
implicit general anti-abuse principle, concluding in the 1987 conduit companies 
report that the pacta sunt servanda principle requires the contracting states to a tax 
treaty to grant treaty benefits “even if considered to be improper,” absent explicit 
anti-abuse provisions within the treaty itself.96 For this reason, some treaties include 
specific provisions declaring that treaty benefits may be denied where doing other-
wise would result in an abuse of the treaty’s provisions.97 Until the MLI, however, 
the inclusion of explicit general anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties was “the excep-
tion rather than the rule.”98
Despite the OECD’s initial unwillingness to recognize an implicit anti-abuse 
principle, that position changed by 2003, as the OECD grew increasingly concerned 
that the expanding tax treaty network posed greater risks of abuse,99 and that the 
increased use of conduit arrangements could result in the granting of tax treaty 
benefits that were not intended by the contracting states.100 Explaining that some 
states consider the abuse of a tax treaty to be an abuse of domestic-law provisions 
protection because that transaction also permits the taxpayer to alleviate his tax burden,” and 
concluding on this basis that transactions or arrangements defeat the object and purpose of a 
tax treaty only where they serve “no purpose other than obtaining the tax advantages.”
 96 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraph 43.
 97 See, for example, article XXIX A(7) of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48, which was 
added by the third protocol in 1995, and article 29(6) of the Canada-Germany tax treaty, which 
was added in 2001 (Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and the Assistance in Tax Matters, signed at Berlin on April 19, 
2001). In the absence of these provisions, an inference might be drawn that the parties intended 
that the treaty would not be subject to a general anti-abuse principle. See, for example, 
Nathalie Goyette and Phil D. Halvorson, “Canada,” in International Fiscal Association, Tax 
Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 171-91, at 185. Indeed, this was the 
basis for the Tax Court of Canada’s conclusion in MIL Investments, supra note 17, at 
paragraph 87, that the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty could not be “construed as containing 
an inherent anti-abuse rule.”
 98 Stef van Weeghel, “General Report,” in Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-
Avoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 17-55, at 46.
 99 Paragraph 8 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital (Paris: OECD, January 2003)), noting that “the extension of double taxation 
conventions increases the risk of abuse by facilitating the use of artificial legal constructions 
aimed at securing the benefits of both the tax advantages available under certain domestic law 
and the reliefs from tax provided for in double taxation conventions.” This observation appears 
in paragraph 55 of the commentary on article 1 of the current OECD model convention, 
which, significantly, substitutes the word “arrangements” for the original words “artificial legal 
constructions.”
 100 Paragraph 11 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99, stating that “there has been a growing tendency toward the use of conduit companies 
to obtain treaty benefits not intended by the Contracting States in their bilateral negotiations.”
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under which taxes are levied,101 while others “consider that a proper construction of 
tax conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions, such as those entered 
into with the view to obtaining unintended benefits under the provisions of these 
conventions,”102 the revised OECD commentary concluded that both approaches 
allow states to deny the benefits of a tax convention “where arrangements that con-
stitute an abuse of the provisions of the convention have been entered into.”103 
More generally, the commentary stated, although “it should not be lightly assumed” 
that a taxpayer has entered into an abusive transaction or arrangement,
[a] guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be 
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements 
was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable 
treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions.104
With this “guiding principle,” therefore, the OECD accepted the idea of an implicit 
general anti-abuse principle that it had rejected several years earlier.
In addition to these statements, the revised OECD commentary contained two 
other comments of relevance to the possible application of the guiding principle. 
First, the commentary declared that although the principal purpose of double taxa-
tion conventions is “to promote, by eliminating international double taxation, 
exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons,” it is 
also a purpose of tax conventions “to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.”105 Second, 
the commentary provided two examples of tax-treaty-shopping transactions or 
arrangements to which a specific or general anti-abuse provision might be expected 
to apply: the first involving “a person (whether or not a resident of a Contracting 
State)” who “acts through a legal entity created in a State essentially to obtain treaty 
benefits that would not be available directly”; the second involving “an individual 
 101 Paragraph 9.2 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 58 of the commentary on article 1 of the current 
OECD model convention.
 102 Paragraph 9.3 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 59 of the commentary on article 1 of the current 
OECD model convention.
 103 Paragraph 9.4 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 60 of the commentary on article 1 of the current 
OECD model convention.
 104 Paragraph 9.5 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the current 
OECD model convention.
 105 Paragraph 7 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. Similar language appears in paragraph 54 of the commentary on article 1 of the 
current OECD model convention, which also states that these purposes are “confirmed” by 
the revised preamble to the convention.
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who has in a Contracting State both his permanent home and all his economic 
interests, including a substantial shareholding in a company of that State, . . . who, 
essentially in order to sell the shares and escape taxation in that State on the capital 
gains from the alienation . . . transfers his permanent home to the other Contracting 
State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax.”106
Although these revisions to the OECD commentary have been criticized on the 
grounds that there is little basis for the claim that a purpose of tax treaties is to 
prevent avoidance,107 and that the guiding principle established a low and indeter-
minate threshold for determining whether a transaction or arrangement was 
abusive,108 the changes appear to have had a significant influence on some judicial 
 106 Paragraph 9 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. Identical language appears in paragraph 56 of the commentary on article 1 of the 
current OECD model convention.
 107 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 330-37, arguing that this claim has little support 
in the provisions of most tax treaties and is inconsistent with the function of tax treaties to 
restrict the application of domestic law. See also Brian J. Arnold, “Tax Treaties and Tax 
Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model” (2004) 58:6 Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 244-60. Arnold states, ibid., at 249, that “it can be argued 
that the purpose of preventing tax avoidance was created out of thin air by the OECD in 
2003,” but he notes as well (ibid., at 247) that the exchange-of-information provision of tax 
treaties can be useful in combatting tax avoidance as well as tax evasion. Although the OECD 
commentary continues to state that a purpose of tax treaties is to prevent avoidance, the 
amended preamble language in article 6(1) of the MLI is somewhat different, stating instead 
that a CTA is not intended to create opportunities for non-taxation or to reduce taxation 
through tax avoidance. In this respect, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 337, arguing that “the 
correct view” is that “treaties are not meant to facilitate avoidance.”
 108 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 319-25, arguing that the first component of the 
guiding principle requiring a tax motivation to be “a main purpose for entering into certain 
transactions or arrangements” is contrary to the principal purpose of tax treaties, which is to 
encourage cross-border economic activities through treaty reliefs and benefits. See also Adolfo 
Martín Jiménez, “The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of 
Tax Treaties: A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries?” (2004) 58:1 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 17-30, at 18-19, arguing that the examples of 
“abusive” tax treaty shopping in paragraph 9 of the revised OECD commentaries may involve 
legitimate tax planning with real substance; and Juan José Zomoza Pérez and Andrés Báez, 
“The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model on Tax Treaties and GAARs: 
A Mistaken Starting Point,” in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer, 
Alfred Storck, and Martin Zagler, eds., Tax Treaties: Building Bridges Between Law and Economics 
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010), 129-59, at 155-58, arguing 
that the object and purpose component of the guiding principle is “circular” if a purpose of tax 
treaties includes the prevention of avoidance, and that the OECD ought to have designed “a 
standard that does not rely on the object and purpose of the treaty provisions, but on the 
special characteristics of the arrangements,” specifically artificiality. Arnold acknowledges the 
“circularity” critique, but he rightly points out that the object and purpose requirement 
presumably turns not on a finding of tax motivation, but on the existence of “a more specific 
treaty scheme or purpose that is frustrated or abused by the transaction.” Arnold, supra 
note 107, at 247. Since many of these criticisms of the OECD’s guiding principle may also be 
applied to the PPT, they will be addressed in more detail in the second part of this article.
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decisions involving tax treaty shopping.109 In A Holdings ApS v. Federal Tax Adminis-
tration,110 where a company resident in Guernsey established a Danish holding 
company whose only activity was to own shares of a company resident in Switzer-
land, the Federal Court of Switzerland relied on an implicit anti-abuse principle to 
deny the Danish company the benefit of a withholding tax exemption on dividends 
that would otherwise have been available to a resident of Denmark under the 
Switzerland-Denmark tax treaty.111 Although the court noted that Denmark recog-
nized an abuse-of-rights concept and that the treaty did not include any reservation 
regarding the Swiss anti-abuse decree, suggesting that the treaty benefit might be 
denied under domestic law, the decision turns on the recognition of an implicit anti-
abuse principle in all tax treaties. According to the court, “[b]ecause the prohibition 
of abuses is part of the principle of good faith” in international law, “the prohibi-
tion of an abuse of rights as regards conventions is . . . recognised . . . without [it] 
being necessary to adopt an explicit provision in the respective convention.”112
Likewise, in Yanko-Weiss v. Holon Assessing Office,113 where a company that was 
incorporated in Israel moved its place of management to Belgium and became a 
resident of Belgium under Belgian tax law, the District Court of Tel Aviv relied on 
an implicit anti-abuse principle to dismiss the taxpayer’s argument that the Israel-
Belgium tax treaty114 required the Israeli tax authority to extend treaty benefits to 
dividends paid to the taxpayer by an Israeli subsidiary even though the company’s 
emigration to Belgium was solely tax-motivated.115 According to the court,
[t]ax treaties were not designed, nor can it be said that any such intent existed, whether 
they include express provisions or not, for use that will be made of them in a manner 
which is not in good faith and in an acceptable manner, or that use can be made of 
them which constitutes improper use of provisions set forth and the benefits which 
they grant.116
 109 See van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 41.
 110 (2005), 8 ITLR 536 (Swiss FC).
 111 Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Denmark for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Net Worth, signed November 23, 
1973. For useful discussions of the case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 445-48; van Weeghel, 
supra note 98, at 38; and René Matteotti and Fabian M. Sutter, “Switzerland: Broad vs Narrow 
Interpretation of the Beneficial Owner Concept,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra 
note 40, 51-58, at 51-54.
 112 A Holdings ApS, supra note 110, at paragraph 3.4.3.
 113 (2007), 10 ITLR 524 (Tel Aviv-Yafo DC).
 114 Convention Between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed at Brussels on July 13, 1972.
 115 For useful discussions of the case, see Guy Katz, “Israel,” in Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: 
Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 407-26, at 417-18; and van Weeghel, 
supra note 98, at 37.
 116 Yanko-Weiss Holdings, supra note 113, at 544 (also cited in David A. Ward, Access to Tax Treaty 
Benefits, Research Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International 
Taxation (Ottawa: Department of Finance, September 2008), at 22).
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On the contrary, it concluded:
[T]reaties for the prevention of double taxation to which Israel is a party are to be read 
as if they contain limitation on benefit provisions in cases where it is proven that there 
exists improper use of a tax treaty, according to standards of the domestic law and 
international law.117
In contrast to these judgments, however, other notable tax cases have rejected 
the argument that treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements are inherently 
abusive. In Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,118 a public interest organization 
challenged a tax department circular confirming that capital gains realized by 
Mauritian residents from the alienation of shares of Indian companies were exempt 
from Indian tax under article 13 of the India-Mauritius tax treaty.119 The Supreme 
Court of India refused to regard tax treaty shopping as an illegal “fraud on the 
treaty” on the grounds that developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage 
capital and technology inflows, that treaty shopping may have been intended when 
the treaty was entered into, and that the Indian minister of finance had himself 
encouraged the use of conduit companies in Mauritius as a way to promote capital 
investment into India.120 Two other cases involved residents of the Netherlands who 
were sole shareholders of Dutch companies, both of whom emigrated to Belgium 
and transferred the effective management of their companies to Belgium shortly 
before realizing proceeds from the liquidation or alienation of these companies.121 
The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) rejected the argument advanced by the 
Dutch tax authorities that the proceeds should be taxable in the Netherlands on a 
reasonable application of the Netherlands-Belgium tax treaty,122 on the ground that 
neither the text of the treaty nor extrinsic materials evidencing the intentions of the 
contracting states demonstrated that the object and purpose of the treaty would be 
 117 Yanko-Weiss Holdings, supra note 113, at 545. According to the court, ibid., at 546, “[t]his 
approach is in line with the interpretation of the OECD of recent years (since 2003) from its 
model convention, although in my opinion, it should have been included even earlier in light of 
the language of the provisions of the Vienna Convention and the doctrine of good faith.”
 118 (2003), 6 ITLR 233 (India SC).
 119 Convention Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of 
Mauritius for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at Port Louis on August 24, 1982.
 120 This case is briefly discussed in Aloke J. Majumdar and P.V. Satya Prasad, “India,” in Tax 
Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 369-88, at 
372-73; and van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 38-39.
 121 (May 12, 2006), BNB 2007/36c and BNB 2007/42 (Netherlands SC). These cases are briefly 
discussed in De Broe, supra note 18, at 412-13.
 122 Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and Capital and the Regulation of Certain Other Fiscal Matters, signed at Brussels on 
October 19, 1970.
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frustrated if the proceeds were not taxed in the Netherlands. Like Canada’s Federal 
Court of Appeal in MIL Investments,123 the courts in these cases could not identify 
any underlying object or purpose in the applicable treaty provision or the treaty as 
a whole that would render the transactions or arrangements abusive.
Beneficial Ownership
In addition to domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance 
rules, and the notion of an implicit anti-abuse principle under international law, the 
concept of beneficial ownership has provided another approach for tax authorities 
to challenge treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements. Introduced into the 
OECD model convention in 1977, the requirement that the recipient of a payment 
be its “beneficial owner” determines the eligibility of residents of a contracting state 
for the reduction or elimination of source-country withholding taxes on dividends, 
interest, and royalties under articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD model convention 
and corresponding provisions of bilateral tax treaties.124
Origins and Pre-2014 OECD Commentaries
First included in the 1942 tax treaty between Canada and the United States,125 and 
added by the 1966 protocol to the 1945 UK-US tax treaty,126 the original purpose of 
the “beneficial owner” language appears to have been primarily to ensure that 
treaty benefits available for payments to nominees and agents were extended to the 
persons on whose behalf these payments were received.127 At the same time, recog-
nition that a resident of one contracting state might deliberately transfer income 
 123 See supra note 75 and the accompanying text.
 124 OECD model convention, article 10(2) (reducing the withholding tax rate on dividends paid to 
a beneficial owner who is resident in the other contracting state); article 11(2) (reducing the 
withholding tax rate on interest paid to a beneficial owner who is resident in the other 
contracting state); and article 12(1) (prohibiting source-country taxation of royalties that are 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other contracting state) (introduced in the 1977 OECD 
model convention, infra note 129).
 125 Convention Between Canada and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Establishment of Rules of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance in the Case of 
Income Taxes, signed at Washington, DC on March 4, 1942 (herein referred to as “the 1942 
Canada-US tax treaty”).
 126 Protocol signed in 1966 amending the Convention Between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of 
America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Washington, DC on April 16, 1945 (herein referred to 
as “the UK-US tax treaty”). See Vann, supra note 92, at 271; and John F. Avery-Jones et al., 
“The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model and Their Adoption by 
States” [2006] no. 6 British Tax Review 695-765, at 753-54.
 127 Vann, supra note 92, at 273-79. In addition, Vann explains, the concept was used “to ensure 
that the reduced rate of tax on subsidiary parent dividends only applied if the subsidiary was a 
real subsidiary” that “was genuinely owned long term by the parent.” Ibid., at 271-72.
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rights to a nominee in a third state in order to obtain otherwise unavailable treaty 
benefits suggested that the concept could also serve an anti-abuse function to prevent 
tax treaty shopping.128 On this basis, the commentary to the 1977 OECD model 
convention explained that “the limitation of tax in the State of source is not available 
when an intermediary, such as an agent or nominee, is interposed between the 
beneficiary and the payer, unless the beneficial owner is a resident of the other 
Contracting State.”129
Since opportunities for tax treaty shopping are not limited to nominees and 
agents, however, it was not long before the OECD identified the use of other conduit 
arrangements as targets to which the beneficial ownership concept might also apply 
to deny treaty benefits. According to the OECD conduit companies report, although 
the commentary to the model convention mentioned only “the case of a nominee 
or agent” when discussing the beneficial owner limitation on treaty benefits for 
dividends, interest, and royalties, the concept would also apply to “other cases 
where a person enters into contracts or takes over obligations under which he has a 
similar function to a nominee or an agent.”130 As a result, the report concluded:
[A] conduit company can normally not be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though 
the formal owner of certain assets, it has very narrow powers which render it a mere 
fiduciary or an administrator acting on account of the interested parties (most likely 
the shareholders of the conduit company).131
Explaining, however, that “it will usually be difficult for the country of source to 
show that the conduit company is not the beneficial owner” and that “not even the 
country of residence of the conduit company may have the necessary information 
regarding the shareholders of the conduit company,” the report added that the 
commentary, “apparently in view of these difficulties,” had observed that the treat-
ment of these companies could be determined through bilateral negotiations.132 
With this statement in mind, much of the report discussed various tax treaty provi-
sions that might be adopted to prevent the use of conduit companies for tax treaty 
shopping.133
 128 Ibid., at 281, noting that the “agent/nominee situation could be deliberately contrived,” and 
ibid., at 281-96, reviewing discussions at the OECD leading up to the 1977 amendments to the 
OECD model convention, infra note 129.
 129 Paragraph 12 of the commentary on article 10 of the 1977 OECD model convention: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Double Taxation Convention 
on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 1977).
 130 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraph 14(b).
 131 Ibid., adding that the fact that a company’s “main function is to hold assets or rights” is “not 
itself sufficient” to categorize a company as “a mere intermediary.”
 132 Ibid.
 133 Ibid., at paragraphs 21-42. These provisions are discussed below under the heading “Treaty-
Based Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules.” According to Vann, supra note 92, at 298, these 
provisions were the “real value” of the report.
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Although the comments in the OECD conduit companies report extending the 
scope of the beneficial owner limitation to conduit companies were not included in 
the commentary to the OECD model convention when it was revised in 1992,134 they 
were adopted as part of the 2003 revisions to the commentary. According to para-
graph 12.1 of the 2003 commentary on article 10 addressing the taxation of 
dividends,
[w]here an item of income is received by a resident of a Contracting State acting in the 
capacity of agent or nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption merely on account 
of the status of the immediate recipient of the income as a resident of the other Con-
tracting State. The immediate recipient of the income in this situation qualifies as a 
resident but no potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that status since 
the recipient is not treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in the State of 
residence. It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Con-
vention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a 
Contracting State, otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply 
acts as a conduit for another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income 
concerned. For these reasons, the report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled 
“Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies” concluded that a 
conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the 
formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in 
relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account 
of the interested parties.135
Identical language was also added to the commentaries on articles 11 and 12 dealing 
with interest and royalties.136
In addition to these paragraphs, the 2003 revisions also included more general 
language stating that
[t]he term “beneficial owner” is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it should 
be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the Convention, 
 134 Vann, supra note 92, at 298.
 135 Paragraph 12.1 of the commentary on article 10 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraphs 12.2 and 12.3 of the commentary on article 10 of 
the current OECD model convention.
 136 Paragraph 8.1 of the commentary on article 11 and paragraph 4.1 of the commentary on 
article 12 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. This language appears in 
paragraphs 10 and 10.1 of the commentary on article 11, and paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of the 
commentary on article 12 of the current OECD model convention. The text of these 
commentaries commences with an introductory sentence stating that “[r]elief or exemption in 
respect of an item of income is granted by the State of source to a resident of the other 
Contracting State to avoid in whole or in part the double taxation that would otherwise arise 
from the concurrent taxation of that income by the State of residence.” Curiously, this sentence 
is omitted from the commentary on article 10.
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including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and 
avoidance.137
As a result, the revised commentary suggested that the concept of beneficial owner 
should not only apply to exclude nominees and agents, but also be broadly inter-
preted to prevent tax avoidance associated with the use of conduit arrangements 
more generally.
Interpretive Options
Since neither the commentary nor the OECD model convention actually defined the 
meaning of beneficial owner, the addition of this language to the 1977 OECD 
model convention and the 2003 revisions to the commentary created a difficult in-
terpretive challenge.138 On the one hand, it might be argued that the term should 
be interpreted according to the domestic-law meaning applied by the relevant 
state.139 On the other hand, it could be argued that the OECD model convention 
adopted a common-law concept of beneficial ownership as the meaning for treaty 
purposes irrespective of the domestic law of the relevant state.140 Alternatively, the 
tax treaty meaning of beneficial owner could have a separate “international fiscal 
meaning” independent of either the domestic law of the relevant state or common-
law concepts.141
Although the first approach is arguably consistent with article 3(2) of the OECD 
model convention and corresponding provisions of bilateral tax treaties, according 
to which a term that is not defined in a tax convention “shall, unless the context 
otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that 
State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies,” this rule cannot 
apply where the domestic law of the state in question has no concept of beneficial 
ownership, as is the case in most civil-law jurisdictions,142 and it is difficult to apply 
where domestic law interprets beneficial ownership in different ways for different 
 137 Paragraph 12 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 9 of the commentary on article 11, 
and paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 12 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 12.1 of the commentary on article 10, 
paragraph 9.1 of the commentary on article 11, and paragraph 4 of the commentary on 
article 12 of the current OECD model convention.
 138 For a useful overview of the various interpretive options, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 
662-94.
 139 See, for example, H. Pijl, “Beneficial Ownership and Second Tier Beneficial Owners in Tax 
Treaties of the Netherlands” (2003) 31:10 Intertax 353-61.
 140 See, for example, Charl P. du Toit, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties 
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1999).
 141 Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell) (looseleaf ), at 
section 10B-14.
 142 De Broe, supra note 18, at 668.
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purposes, as is the case in at least some common-law jurisdictions.143 Nor is it desir-
able to apply a domestic-law meaning only for the purposes of taxes imposed by 
states with a clear domestic-law meaning of beneficial ownership, since this would 
result in different meanings of the term “beneficial owner” in different treaties and 
asymmetrical meanings in treaties where one of the contracting states does not 
recognize the concept in its domestic law.144 In addition, the OECD commentary 
makes no reference to domestic-law meanings of beneficial ownership, and the 2003 
revisions to the commentary explicitly state that “the term . . . is not used in a narrow 
and technical sense” but “rather . . . should be understood in its context and in light 
of the object and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.”145 For these reasons, even 
where a meaning of the term “beneficial owner” can be determined under the 
domestic law of the relevant state, it seems reasonable to conclude that the context 
in which the term is used in the OECD model convention and in bilateral tax treaties 
based on the model convention requires a meaning other than that under domestic 
law.146
The second interpretation, that the OECD model convention adopted a common-
law concept of beneficial ownership as an independent treaty concept, is also 
unconvincing. Although the term “beneficial owner” is itself obviously derived from 
common-law legal systems and was originally used in tax treaties between common-
law jurisdictions, the common-law concept relates to the ownership of assets while 
the tax treaty concept concerns entitlement to income, suggesting that these are 
different concepts with different meanings.147 This conclusion is also supported by 
translations of “beneficial owner” in other tax treaties, including in particular the 
official French version of the OECD model convention. Those translations refer not 
to ownership at all, but to the “real beneficiary” (“bénéficiaire effectif” in French 
 143 See, for example, Catherine Brown, “Symposium: Beneficial Ownership and the Income Tax 
Act” (2003) 51:1 Canadian Tax Journal 401-53, at 452, concluding that the term “beneficial 
ownership” may have “multiple meanings” for tax purposes, which “may change depending on 
the provision in issue.” In New Zealand, on the other hand, the concept of beneficial 
ownership apparently has a clear meaning under domestic law. Craig Elliffe, “The 
Interpretation and Meaning of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in New Zealand” [2009] no. 3 British Tax 
Review 276-305.
 144 De Broe, supra note 18, at 669-71.
 145 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
 146 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 672; and Michael N. Kandev, “Tax Treaty 
Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning Under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model” 
(2007) 55:1 Canadian Tax Journal 31-71, at 59-60 and 69.
 147 De Broe, supra note 18, at 679. The distinction is most apparent with respect to beneficiaries 
of common-law trusts, who are generally understood to be the beneficial owners of the trust 
property for common-law purposes but not necessarily the beneficial owners of trust income 
for tax treaty purposes. See John Prebble, “Accumulation Trusts and Double Tax Conventions” 
[2001] no. 1 British Tax Review 69-82, at 75-80.
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and “beneficario efectivo” in Spanish) or the person who is “entitled to use” (“Nut-
zungsberechtigter” in German) or “ultimately entitled to” (“Uiteindelijik gerechtigde” 
in Dutch) the income.148 Finally, there is nothing in the OECD commentary to sug-
gest that the use of this term in the OECD model convention was intended to be 
limited to a common-law meaning, and the 2003 revisions to the commentary em-
phasize the very opposite—that “the term . . . is not used in a narrow and technical 
sense” but “rather . . . should be understood in its context and in light of the object 
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.”149 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that 
two civil-law jurisdictions would deliberately agree to incorporate a common-law 
concept into a bilateral tax treaty between them.150 As a result, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the tax treaty concept of beneficial ownership has an “international 
fiscal meaning” that is independent not only of the domestic law of the contracting 
states but also of any common-law meaning.151
Accepting that the term “beneficial owner” has an autonomous international 
fiscal meaning for tax treaty purposes, however, does not determine whether that 
meaning should be broadly construed according to the economic substance of 
transactions or arrangements, or be more narrowly understood in terms of their 
legal character. A broad economic approach is supported by a presumed purpose of 
the concept to discourage tax treaty shopping,152 and by statements in the 2003 
revised OECD commentary that the term “beneficial owner” is not used “in a narrow 
technical sense,”153 does not contemplate a person who “acts as a conduit for another 
person who in fact receives the benefit of the income concerned,”154 and would not 
normally include a conduit company “if . . . it has, as a practical matter, very narrow 
powers . . . in relation to the income concerned.”155 A narrower legal approach is 
premised on the original focus in the OECD commentary on agents or nominees,156 
on the statement in the 2003 commentary that a conduit company cannot be 
regarded as the beneficial owner of income where it has “very narrow powers which 
render it, in relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting 
on account of the interested parties,”157 and on the fact that the 2003 revisions to 
the OECD commentary also included several paragraphs identifying treaty-based 
 148 See du Toit, supra note 140, at 165.
 149 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
 150 De Broe, supra note 18, at 679.
 151 Ibid.
 152 See, for example, Pijl, supra note 139, at 354-56.
 153 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
 154 See supra note 135 and the accompanying text (emphasis added).
 155 Ibid. (emphasis added).
 156 See supra note 129 and the accompanying text.
 157 See supra note 135 and the accompanying text (emphasis added). See, for example, De Broe, 
supra note 18, at 686.
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specific anti-avoidance rules to address conduit arrangements158—which arguably 
would be unnecessary if the term “beneficial owner” were broadly construed as an 
anti-avoidance concept that can be used to challenge any conduit arrangement.159 
Moreover, to the extent that the 2003 revisions to the OECD commentary expanded 
the meaning of beneficial owner, it might also be argued that a broad economic 
understanding of this term should not apply to tax treaties that were concluded 
before these revisions.160 In the absence of any further guidance, however, the 
meaning of the tax treaty concept of beneficial ownership was left to the courts.
Judicial Decisions
Perhaps not surprisingly, given varied statements in the OECD commentaries, judicial 
decisions following the 2003 revisions have taken different positions on the meaning 
of beneficial ownership, with some courts adopting a broad economic approach and 
others emphasizing the legal character of the transactions or arrangements at 
issue.161 In Indofood International Finance Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, London 
Branch,162 for example, where the UK courts were called upon to rule on the viability 
of a proposed financing arrangement in order to resolve a commercial dispute, the 
High Court construed the meaning of the term “beneficial owner” by reference to 
 158 Paragraphs 13-20 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. See the discussion below under the heading “Treaty-Based Specific Anti-Avoidance 
Rules.”
 159 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Beneficial Ownership: Current Trends” (2010) 2:1 World Tax Journal 
35-63, at 54.
 160 Although opinions differ on the relevance of subsequent OECD commentaries to the 
interpretation of treaties concluded before the commentaries were adopted, most commentators 
conclude that revisions that exceed mere clarification should not be taken into account. See, 
for example, John F. Avery Jones, “The Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentaries After 
a Treaty Is Concluded” (2002) 56:3 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 102-9; 
Michael Lang and Florian Brugger, “The Role of the OECD Commentary in Tax Treaty 
Interpretation” (2008) 23:2 Australian Tax Forum 95-108; and Michael N. Kandev and 
Matthew Peters, “Treaty Interpretation: The Concept of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in Canadian Tax 
Treaty Theory and Practice,” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Third Tax Conference, 2011 
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), 26:1-60. In several cases, 
however, courts have been willing to consider the 2003 OECD commentary in interpreting the 
meaning of the term “beneficial owner” for the purposes of treaties concluded before 2003. 
See, for example, Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 FCA 57; aff’g. 2008 TCC 231, in which 
the Federal Court of Appeal stated (at paragraph 11) that “later Commentaries” could be relied 
upon to interpret a tax treaty concluded prior to these commentaries “when they represent a 
fair interpretation of the words of the Model Convention and do not conflict with 
Commentaries in existence at the time a specific treaty was entered and when, of course, 
neither treaty partner has registered an objection to the new Commentaries.” This case is 
discussed in more detail below—see infra notes 201-211 and the accompanying text.
 161 For a comprehensive review of cases in multiple jurisdictions, see Angelika Meindl-Ringer, 
Beneficial Ownership in International Tax Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Wolters 
Kluwer, 2016), at chapter 5.
 162 [2005] EWHC 2103; rev’d. [2006] EWCA Civ. 158.
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legal relationships while the Court of Appeal looked to economic or commercial 
substance.163 The facts of the case involved an Indonesian company (“the parent 
guarantor”), which borrowed funds in 2002 through a Mauritian finance subsidiary 
(“the issuer”) in order to obtain the benefit of the 10 percent withholding tax rate 
under the 1996 Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty.164 When the Indonesian government 
terminated the treaty effective January 1, 2005, the issuer invoked an early redemp-
tion clause that was available if the treaty was terminated in order to refinance at 
lower interest rates prevailing at the time. Since the early redemption option was 
available only if there was no reasonable alternative arrangement through which a 
10 percent withholding tax rate could be maintained, the lenders argued that early 
redemption was prohibited because the debt could be assigned to a new company 
resident in the Netherlands (“Newco”), which would be eligible for the same with-
holding tax rate as the Mauritian subsidiary. The issuer argued that the Indonesian 
tax authorities would not recognize Newco as the beneficial owner of the interest 
for the purpose of the reduced withholding tax rate under the Indonesia-Netherlands 
tax treaty.165 As a result, the UK courts were put in the odd position of having to rule 
on how Indonesian law would view the proposed restructuring.
At the High Court, the issuer relied on correspondence in which the Indonesian 
tax authorities adopted a broad economic understanding of beneficial ownership, 
concluding that they would not regard Newco as the beneficial owner of interest 
received from the parent guarantor because “the term ‘beneficial owner’ means the 
actual owner of the interest income who truly has the full right to enjoy directly the 
benefits of that interest income,” not a “conduit company” such as Newco.166 
Rejecting this interpretation, the court adopted a legal conception of beneficial 
ownership, concluding that Newco would “not be a nominee or agent for any other 
party” or “any sort of trustee or fiduciary.”167 Instead, the court reasoned, since 
 163 For useful discussions of the case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 706-13; and Philip Baker, 
“United Kingdom: Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA,” in 
Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 27-38.
 164 The Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Jakarta on December 10, 1996.
 165 Convention Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Jakarta on January 29, 2002 
(herein referred to as “the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty”).
 166 Indofood, supra note 162 (HC), at paragraph 26.
 167 Ibid., at paragraph 46. Although this conclusion might suggest that the court adopted a 
domestic-law meaning of beneficial ownership based on the common law of England (which 
would have been inappropriate for the task before it—namely, determining how beneficial 
ownership would be understood in Indonesia), the court’s references to the OECD conduit 
companies report and the OECD commentaries as interpreted by Philip Baker suggest more 
strongly that it considered the international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership to be 
indistinguishable from its common-law meaning.
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Newco would “have the power to dispose of the interest when received as it wishes, 
although . . . constrained by its contractual obligation . . . to apply the proceeds of 
the interest” to the ultimate lenders,168 and any undistributed interest that it received 
would be generally available to all its creditors in the event of its insolvency,169 it 
followed that Newco would be the beneficial owner of the interest and the reduced 
withholding tax rate in the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty would apply.170 On this 
basis, the High Court found for the lenders.
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, adopted a broad meaning of beneficial 
ownership and allowed the issuer’s appeal on the basis that Newco would not be the 
beneficial owner of the interest. Since “the term ‘beneficial owner’ is to be given an 
international fiscal meaning not derived from domestic laws of contracting states,” 
the court explained, it was “by no means conclusive” that “neither the Issuer nor 
Newco was or would be a trustee, agent or nominee . . . in relation to the interest 
receivable from the Parent Guarantor.”171 On the contrary, the court continued, the 
2003 OECD commentary and observations on that commentary demonstrate that 
“the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the formal owner 
who does not have ‘the full privilege to directly benefit from the income.’ ”172 In 
addition, the court explained, since this concept is not limited to a “technical and 
legal . . . approach,” it follows that courts should have regard not only to the “legal, 
commercial and practical structure” of the arrangement, but also to “the substance 
of the matter.”173 On both grounds, therefore, the court concluded that neither the 
issuer nor Newco could be regarded as the beneficial owner of the interest, since 
the former was and the latter would be “bound to pay” all interest received from the 
parent guarantor to the paying agent for the lenders once the interest was received,174 
making it “impossible to conceive of any ‘direct benefit’ from the interest payable 
by the Parent Guarantor except by funding its liability” to the lenders.175 As a result, 
it followed that the assignment of the debt to Newco was not a reasonable alternative 
 168 Indofood, supra note 162 (HC), at paragraph 46.
 169 Ibid., at paragraph 49.
 170 The High Court also concluded, ibid., at paragraph 47, that Newco would have earned a profit 
on an interest-rate spread that the Netherlands tax authorities would have insisted upon under 
domestic “substance and risk” requirements. The Court of Appeal concluded that the High 
Court was mistaken on this point, since the “substance and risk” requirement “would be 
satisfied by providing Newco with a combination of ‘handling charges’ and paid up equity 
capital.” Indofood, supra note 162 (CA), at paragraph 22.
 171 Ibid., at paragraph 42.
 172 Ibid., citing a circular letter issued by the Indonesian director of general taxes (DTG).
 173 Ibid., at paragraphs 43-44.
 174 Ibid. Indeed, it was agreed at the appeal hearing that the parent guarantor actually bypassed the 
issuer, making payments directly to the paying agent. Ibid., at paragraph 13.
 175 Ibid., at paragraph 44, adding that neither the issuer nor Newco had “the ‘full privilege’ needed 
to qualify as the beneficial owner of the income, rather the position of Issuer and Newco 
equates to that of an ‘administrator of the income.’ ”
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arrangement through which a 10 percent withholding tax rate could be 
maintained.176
Although Indofood was a commercial case addressing the meaning of beneficial 
ownership in the context of the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty, the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that the term “beneficial owner” has an international fiscal 
meaning implies that this meaning would apply to all states, and not only to Indo-
nesia.177 This point was not lost on Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC), 
which released draft guidance on the decision that was subsequently incorporated 
into the HMRC International Manual.178 The guidance explained that the Court of 
Appeal decision was consistent with UK policy and had “simply confirmed” the 
position taken in the OECD commentary that
beneficial ownership “should be understood in its context and in light of the object 
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the preven-
tion of fiscal evasion and avoidance” and that tests of the legal structure, and of the 
commercial and practical substance of the scheme, should be adopted to determine 
beneficial ownership.179
The guidance also stated that HMRC would apply this broad international fiscal 
meaning in the context of double tax conventions (DTCs) when “the substance of an 
arrangement amounts to an improper use of the relevant DTC in the light of the 
DTC’s object of prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance, for example, ‘treaty 
shopping.’ ”180 As a result, HMRC affirmed the use of beneficial ownership as an 
anti-avoidance concept to address tax treaty shopping.
Tax authorities and courts in other countries have also adopted a broad under-
standing of beneficial ownership in order to challenge treaty-shopping transactions 
or arrangements. In a number of Spanish cases involving payments by the Real 
Madrid football team to Hungarian companies for the image rights of various team 
members,181 the Audiencia National held that the Hungarian companies were not 
the beneficial owners of the royalties on the ground that the concept of beneficial 
 176 Ibid., at paragraph 59.
 177 Baker, supra note 163, at 32.
 178 United Kingdom, HM Revenue & Customs, International Manual (London: HMRC), 
INTM332050, “Double Taxation Applications and Claims: HMRC Reaction to Indofood 
Case” (www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/international-manual/intm332050).
 179 Ibid., at paragraph 2.
 180 Ibid., at paragraph 4.
 181 ( July 18, 2006), JUR\2006\204307, JUR\2007\8915, and JUR\2007\6549; (November 10, 
2006), JUR\2006\284679; ( July 20, 2006), JUR\2007\6526; (November 13, 2006), 
JUR\2006\284618; and (March 26, 2007), JUR\2007\101877. This summary is based on the 
discussion in Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Beneficial Ownership as a Broad Anti-Avoidance 
Provision: Decisions by Spanish Courts and the OECD’s Discussion Draft,” in Beneficial 
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 127-42, at 128-33.
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ownership is intended to prevent tax treaty shopping and must therefore be given a 
broad “economic interpretation” suggested by the 2003 revisions to the OECD com-
mentary.182 Of particular relevance to the decisions were the fact that all but a 
small percentage of the royalties (0.5 percent to 2 percent) were paid to companies 
resident in Cyprus or the Netherlands when received, and the inference that the 
only purpose for interposing the Hungarian companies was to take advantage of 
the fact that the tax treaty between Spain and Hungary imposed no withholding tax 
on royalties—unlike almost all other Spanish tax treaties at the time.183
Similarly in Denmark, where the tax authorities have denied withholding tax 
relief in a large number of cases involving payments to alleged conduit companies, 
at least two judgments of the Danish Tax Tribunal have relied on a broad economic 
interpretation of beneficial ownership to uphold these assessments.184 In the HHU 
case,185 a Jersey company that had acquired the shares of a Danish company trans-
ferred the shares to a Swedish holding company structure. The Jersey company 
then loaned funds to the Swedish companies, which loaned the funds to the Danish 
company. The tribunal held that the Swedish companies were not the beneficial 
owners of interest received from the Danish company on the grounds that all moneys 
received were automatically paid on to the Jersey company without any tax in 
Sweden; that the Swedish companies had no employees, no office or administration, 
and no business activities in Sweden; and that the purpose of the arrangement was 
to avoid Danish withholding tax.186 The Cook case187 involved a similar structure in 
which a Cayman Islands company transferred shares of a Danish company to a 
Swedish holding company structure, to which it loaned funds that were re-loaned 
to the Danish company. In this case also, the tribunal held that the Swedish com-
panies were not the beneficial owners of interest received from the Danish company 
on the grounds that the interest payments were distributed to the Cayman Islands 
company without any Swedish tax, and that the holding companies engaged in no 
activities other than holding shares of the Danish company.188
Likewise in Switzerland, where the Federal Court relied on an implicit anti-
abuse principle to challenge tax treaty shopping in A Holdings ApS,189 the courts have 
endorsed a broad economic concept of beneficial ownership in order to deny tax 
 182 Jiménez, supra note 181, at 130.
 183 Ibid., at 129.
 184 See Jakob Bundgaard, “Danish Case Law Developments on Beneficial Ownership” (2012) 68:1 
Tax Notes International 63-74.
 185 SKM 2011.57 LSR (Danish Tax Tribunal). The summary of the case presented here is based on 
the discussion in Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 67-69.
 186 Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 68.
 187 SKM 2011.485 LSR (Danish Tax Tribunal). The summary of the case presented here is based 
on the discussion in Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 69-70.
 188 Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 70.
 189 See the discussion of this case in the text above at note 110 and following.
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treaty benefits. In the VSA case,190 two UK companies, one of which was resident in 
the Isle of Man, loaned funds to a Luxembourg holding company, which that com-
pany used to acquire shares of a Swiss company. The Swiss Tax Appeals Commission 
held that dividends paid to the Luxembourg company were not eligible for treaty 
benefits under the Switzerland-Luxembourg tax treaty on the grounds that the 
Luxembourg company was neither the bénéficiaire nor the bénéficiaire effectif of 
the dividend as required by the treaty.191 Concluding that these terms contemplate 
“the person who economically enjoys the income and not a conduit company inter-
posed between the debtor of the income and the ultimate recipient,”192 the 
commission held that the Luxembourg company did not qualify because the full 
amount of the dividends that it received was used to pay interest on the shareholder 
loans and some other charges, so that the economic benefit of the income was 
enjoyed exclusively by the UK and Manx companies.193
A more recent Swiss case involved a Danish bank that entered into swap agree-
ments with counterparties in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, and hedged against these swap agreements by purchasing shares of 
Swiss companies, the total return on which determined the amount of the swap 
payments that the Danish bank was obliged to pay to the counterparties.194 Although 
the Federal Administrative Court had held that the Danish bank was the beneficial 
owner of dividends that it received from the Swiss companies, the Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court reversed that decision on the basis that the factual interdependence 
of the payments deprived the Danish bank of beneficial ownership. Concluding that 
 190 (February 28, 2001), 4 ILTS 2002, 191 (Swiss Commission of Appeals in Tax Matters). The 
summary of the case presented here is based on the discussion in De Broe, supra note 18, at 
702-6.
 191 Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Bern 
on January 21, 1993. Under article 10(2) of the treaty, dividends were subject to a 5 percent 
withholding tax rate if the bénéficiaire effectif of the dividend was a company holding directly 
at least 25 percent of the capital of a Swiss company, and were exempt from Swiss withholding 
tax altogether if the bénéficiaire held directly for an uninterrupted period of two years 
preceding payment of the dividends at least 25 percent of the capital of the Swiss company. 
Since the case involved dividend payments in two years and it was not clear that the 
Luxembourg subsidiary had held the shares for more than two years in the first of these years, 
the decisions addressed the meaning of both terms.
 192 Cited in De Broe, supra note 18, at 703.
 193 Ibid., at 702.
 194 (May 5, 2015), BGE 141 II 447, no. 2C_364/2012 (Swiss Federal Supreme Court). The 
summary of the case presented here is based on the discussions in Matteotti and Sutter, supra 
note 111, at 55-58; and Stefano Bernasconi and Michael Beusch, “Switzerland: ‘Swap Case’ and 
Beneficial Ownership,” in Peter Essers, Eric Kemmeren, Daniël Smit, Michael Lang, Jeffrey 
Owens, Pasquale Pistone, Alexander Rust, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer, and Alfred Storck, 
eds., Tax Treaty Case Law Around the Globe 2016 (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, 2017), 295-303.
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the key element of beneficial ownership involves “the power of disposal” (Verfü-
gungsberechtigung), which needs to be assessed in accordance with the economic 
substance of the transaction or arrangement, taking into account “any legal, con-
tractual or factual limitation” on the use of and benefit from the income as well as 
any risks borne by the recipient,195 the court held that the Danish bank was not the 
beneficial owner of the dividends because the full amount of the dividends was com-
mitted to the counterparties in the form of the swap payments and the Danish bank 
did not bear any risk in respect of this income or its share ownership in the Swiss 
companies.196
In contrast to these decisions, other cases have adopted a narrower meaning of 
the term “beneficial owner,” emphasizing legal rights and relationships rather 
than the economic substance of transactions or arrangements. In a decision involving 
a UK-resident company that had purchased detached dividend coupons from shares 
of the Royal Dutch Oil Company after dividends had been declared but before they 
were payable,197 the Hoge Raad held that the UK company was the beneficial owner 
of the dividend and was entitled to the reduced withholding tax rate under the 
Netherlands-UK tax treaty198 on the grounds that it had free disposal of the coupons 
and the dividend income when paid, and that it did not act as an agent (zaakwaar-
nemer) or for the account of a principal (lasthebber). Although the case did not 
involve a conduit arrangement in which a dividend recipient distributed such income 
to a third party resident in another state,199 the decision has been interpreted to 
stand for the proposition that an entity that is not legally or contractually obliged 
to pay specific amounts that it has received to one or more third parties is the bene-
ficial owner of that income.200
 195 Bernasconi and Beusch, supra note 194, at 299-300.
 196 Ibid., at 300. Interestingly, the court came to this conclusion notwithstanding the absence of an 
explicit beneficial owner requirement in the Switzerland-Denmark tax treaty, supra note 111; 
the court considered this requirement to be implicit in all Swiss tax treaties.
 197 ( June 6, 1994), BNB 1994/217 (Netherlands Supreme Court) (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Royal Dutch Oil Company case”). The summary presented here is based on discussions of the 
case in De Broe, supra note 18, at 694-97, and Daniël S. Smit, “The Concept of Beneficial 
Ownership and Possible Alternative Remedies in Netherlands Case Law,” in Beneficial 
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 59-89, at 62-65.
 198 Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital 
Gains, signed at The Hague on November 7, 1980.
 199 On this basis, du Toit argues that the case does not provide “unqualified sanctioning for the use 
of conduit entities in situations where there is a legal obligation on the conduit entity to pay on 
the distributions received.” See du Toit, supra note 140, at 154.
 200 See, for example, van Weeghel, supra note 86, at 77.
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In Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen,201 companies resident in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom acquired shares of a Canadian company through a holding company that 
they had established in the Netherlands in order to obtain the benefit of a lower 
withholding tax rate on dividends from the Canadian company. The Tax Court of 
Canada adopted a similar legal understanding of beneficial ownership to that out-
lined above, to conclude that the Dutch holding company (“PHBV”) was the 
beneficial owner of dividends that it received from the Canadian company—even 
though the Dutch company had no physical office or employees in the Netherlands 
or elsewhere, and it distributed most of the dividend income to its parent companies 
in accordance with a shareholders’ agreement entered into between the two parent 
companies.202 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that the term “beneficial owner” 
should be given a broad international fiscal meaning, looking “behind the legal 
relationships in order to identify the person who, as a matter of fact, can ultimately 
benefit from the dividends,”203 the court relied on domestic law and the OECD com-
mentaries to conclude that “the ‘beneficial owner’ of dividends is the person who 
receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk 
and control of the dividend he or she received.”204 According to the court,
 201 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC).
 202 For a useful discussion of the case, see Brian J. Arnold, “The Concept of Beneficial Ownership 
Under Canada’s Tax Treaties,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 39-49, at 
40-43. Arnold concludes, ibid., at 43, that the decision “makes sense in policy and practical 
terms” since Canada’s treaty negotiators “knew or should have known” when they agreed, in a 
1993 protocol to the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, to a reduced withholding tax rate on 
dividends that the lower rate “would make Netherlands holding companies attractive as 
vehicles for holding investments in Canadian companies” and yet “did not insist on the 
inclusion of a limitation-on-benefit provision or other protection against treaty shopping 
through the use of Netherlands holding companies.” (See the Convention Between Canada 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at The Hague on May 27, 1986, as 
amended by the protocols signed on March 14, 1993 and August 25, 1997 [herein referred to 
as “the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty”].) Although Arnold’s conclusion suggests that the 
arrangement, though clearly tax treaty shopping, was not abusive, it does not address the 
meaning of the term “beneficial owner.”
 203 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC), at paragraph 84. The Crown’s argument turned mainly on 
the official translations of the term “beneficial owner” in French and Dutch, which, it argued, 
strongly suggested a factual determination. Ibid., at paragraphs 78 and 82.
 204 Ibid., at paragraph 100. Although the court (mistakenly in my view) stated that article 3(2) of 
the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty (supra note 202) required it “to look to a domestic solution 
in interpreting ‘beneficial owner’,” it added that the OECD commentaries were “also relevant” 
and considered both common-law and civil-law conceptions of beneficial ownership under 
domestic law. Ibid., at paragraphs 95 and 97-98. As a result, as the Federal Court of Appeal 
concluded, the decision was based not solely on the domestic-law meaning of “beneficial 
owner” nor on a common-law understanding of this term, but on “general, technical and legal 
meanings,” including those expressed in the OECD commentaries and the OECD conduit 
companies report. See infra note 210 and the accompanying text.
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[t]he person who is [the] beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who enjoys and 
assumes all the attributes of ownership. In short the dividend is for the owner’s own 
benefit and this person is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the 
dividend income. . . . It is the true owner of the property who is the beneficial owner 
of the property. Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of 
a nominee, one looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is acting or for 
whom the nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate entities are concerned, 
one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another 
person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put 
through it as conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that 
person’s instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for 
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for clients.205
Since the shareholders’ agreement bound only the parent companies and not 
PHBV,206 which had to declare and pay dividends in accordance with Dutch law,207 
the court concluded that there was “no predetermined and automatic flow of funds” 
to the parent companies,208 and that the dividends became property of PHBV that 
was generally available to the holding company’s creditors and available for its use 
as it wished.209
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that the Tax 
Court had erroneously adopted a purely common-law conception of beneficial 
ownership, concluding that the judge’s interpretation “captures the essence of the 
concepts of ‘beneficial owner,’ ‘bénéficiaire effectif ’ as it emerges from the review of 
the general, technical and legal meanings of the terms” and “accords with what is 
stated in the OECD Commentaries and in the Conduit Companies Report.”210 It 
also rejected the Crown’s argument that “beneficial owner” means “the person who 
can, in fact, ultimately benefit from the dividend,” on the grounds that this 
definition
does not appear anywhere in the OECD documents and the very use of the word “can” 
opens up a myriad of possibilities which would jeopardize the relative degree of 
certainty and stability that a tax treaty seeks to achieve.211
 205 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC), at paragraph 100.
 206 Ibid., at paragraph 103.
 207 Ibid., at paragraph 104.
 208 Ibid., at paragraph 102.
 209 Ibid., at paragraph 105.
 210 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (FCA), at paragraph 14.
 211 Ibid., at paragraph 15, adding that “[t]he Crown . . . is asking the Court to adopt a pejorative 
view of holding companies which neither Canadian domestic law, the international community 
nor the Canadian government through the process of objection, have adopted.”
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In Velcro Canada Inc. v. The Queen,212 the Tax Court of Canada held that a holding 
company resident in the Netherlands was the beneficial owner of royalties received 
under a licence agreement that its parent company assigned to it immediately after 
moving its residence from the Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, even 
though the holding company was contractually obliged to pay 90 percent of all 
amounts received to the parent.213 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that this con-
tractual obligation deprived the holding company of the “use and enjoyment” of the 
royalties,214 the court held that there was no “automatic” or “predetermined flow of 
funds”215 because royalties were received in Canadian dollars and converted into 
Dutch or US funds;216 the royalties were not segregated from the holding company’s 
other funds;217 the holding company had 30 days before it had to make payments to 
its parent;218 and the agreement allowed the holding company to retain 10 percent 
of the royalties that it received.219 For these reasons, the court concluded, the hold-
ing company was not “a mere agent, nominee or conduit” with no discretion as to 
the use or application of the royalties220 but had possession, use, and control of this 
income,221 and assumed risks in relation to the royalties, which were available to 
creditors and were subject to currency fluctuations.222
2014 Revisions to the OECD Commentary
Given the differing judicial opinions on the meaning of beneficial owner, and the 
uncertainty created by these differences, it is not surprising that several commentators 
began to call upon the OECD to clarify the meaning of the term,223 or that the OECD 
took up this task in the spring of 2011 when it released a discussion draft containing 
 212 2012 TCC 57.
 213 For a useful discussion of the case, see Arnold, supra note 202, at 44-48.
 214 Velcro, supra note 212, at paragraph 28.
 215 Ibid., at paragraphs 28 and 45.
 216 Ibid., at paragraph 40.
 217 Ibid., at paragraph 33.
 218 Ibid., at paragraph 28.
 219 Ibid., at paragraph 43. Since the withholding tax rate on royalties was 10 percent under the 
Canada-Netherlands tax treaty for some of the years at issue, Arnold concludes that the legal 
obligation to pay 90 percent of royalties received effectively meant that the holding company 
was required to pay all after-tax income to the parent. Arnold, supra note 202, at 47. This 
conclusion, however, is not clear from the facts, and would not apply to some of the years at 
issue during which royalties were exempt from withholding tax in Canada.
 220 Velcro, supra note 212, at paragraph 51.
 221 Ibid., at paragraphs 35, 37-38, and 42.
 222 Ibid., at paragraph 40.
 223 See, for example, Jinyan Li, “Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation and 
the Case for Clarity,” in Philip Baker and Catherine Bobbett, eds., Tax Polymath: A Life in 
International Taxation (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010), 
187-209, at 206-9.
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proposed revisions to the OECD commentary.224 Adopted with some modifications 
in 2014, these revisions include five important statements on the meaning of the 
term “beneficial owner.”
First, the 2014 revisions explain, since the term “beneficial owner” was added to 
the OECD model convention to address potential uncertainties in the application of 
articles 10, 11, and 12 to the payment of dividends, interest, and royalties to inter-
mediaries, it was not intended to refer to “any technical meaning that it could have 
under the domestic law of a specific country,” nor was it “used in a narrow technical 
sense (such as the meaning that it has under the trust law of many common law 
countries),” but it was “intended to be interpreted in this context . . . and in light of 
the object and purposes of the Convention.”225 In other words, as argued earlier,226 
the term was always intended to have an international fiscal meaning independent 
of the domestic law of a specific state and any common-law meaning.
Second, the revised commentary notes, in each of the examples in which the 
direct recipient of a payment is not regarded as its beneficial owner (that is, an 
agent, a nominee, and a conduit company acting as a fiduciary or administrator), the 
recipient’s “right to use and enjoy the dividend” is “constrained by a contractual or 
legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person.”227 In this 
respect, the revised commentary rejects the broad economic meaning of beneficial 
owner adopted in several judicial decisions,228 affirming instead the narrower legal 
understanding of the term applied in Prévost Car229 and in the Royal Dutch Oil 
Company case.230
Third, the revised commentary continues, the existence of a contractual or legal 
obligation to pass on a payment received to another person
will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on 
the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly 
 224 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Clarification of the Meaning of 
“Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion Draft (Paris: OECD, April 29, 
2011).
 225 Paragraphs 12 and 12.1 of the commentary on article 10, paragraphs 9 and 9.1 of the 
commentary on article 11, and paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD 
model convention (introduced in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2014 (Paris: OECD, July 
2014)).
 226 Supra notes 138-151 and the accompanying text.
 227 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on 
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
 228 See the cases discussed at supra notes 162-196 and the accompanying text.
 229 See supra notes 201-211 and the accompanying text.
 230 Supra notes 197-211 and the accompanying text. For a similar conclusion, see Robert J. Danon, 
“Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World: An Analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the 
Principal Purpose Test for MNE Groups” (2018) 72:1 Bulletin for International Taxation 31-55, 
at 34-35.
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does not have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual 
or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person.231
Although the test for determining beneficial ownership remains whether or not the 
recipient has a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment to another 
person, therefore, evidence of this obligation may be derived not only from “relevant 
legal documents” but also from the “facts and circumstances” of the transactions or 
arrangements.232
Fourth, the revised commentary adds, a contractual or legal obligation to pass on 
a payment received to another person “would not include contractual or legal obli-
gations that are not dependent on the receipt of the payment by the direct 
recipient”—for example,
an obligation that is not dependent on the receipt of the payment and which the direct 
recipient has as a debtor or as a party to financial transactions, or typical distribution 
obligations of pension schemes and of collective investment vehicles entitled to treaty 
benefits.233
As a result, the kind of legal or contractual obligation to pass on a payment that 
would deprive the direct recipient of a payment of recognition as its beneficial 
owner is not any contractual or legal obligation that happens to be financed by the 
payment as a factual matter (a relationship of factual dependence), but a contrac-
tual or legal obligation that is contractually or legally dependent on the receipt of 
the payment by the direct recipient (a relationship of contractual or legal depen-
dence). Although this dependence clearly existed in Velcro234 and may have existed 
in many of the cases decided under a broader economic interpretation of the term 
beneficial owner,235 it was not the case in Prévost Car,236 where the shareholders’ 
 231 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on 
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
 232 For this reason, the reference to the “substance” of the recipient’s right should not be read to 
invite the kind of broad economic analysis that an emphasis on contractual or legal obligations 
denies. For a similar conclusion, see Danon, supra note 230, at 35.
 233 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on 
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
 234 Velcro, supra note 212.
 235 See the cases discussed in the text above at notes 162-198. In particular, see Indofood, supra 
note 162, where the Court of Appeal held that Newco would be “bound to pay” all interest 
received from the parent guarantor to the paying agent for the lenders once the interest was 
received, and the Spanish cases involving payments by the Real Madrid soccer team to 
Hungarian companies, supra note 180, where all but a very small percentage of the royalties 
were paid on to companies in other states. According to Jiménez, for example, the Audiencia 
National “could have reached the same conclusion by simply analysing the legal position of the 
Hungarian companies and without assimilating the concept of beneficial ownership to a broad 
anti-abuse provision.” Jiménez, supra note 180, at 132. Similarly, Baker notes that the facts in 
(Notes 235 and 236 are continued on page 661.)
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agreement between the parent companies was not contractually or legally binding 
on the holding company. Nor is it likely that this test would be satisfied for payments 
under the swap agreements in the Swiss swap case,237 which were factually depend-
ent on dividends that the Danish bank received from Swiss companies once it had 
hedged its position by purchasing shares, but presumably were not contractually or 
legally dependent on those payments. For this reason, as several commentators have 
observed, the revised commentary narrows the scope of the beneficial ownership 
requirement as a mechanism to challenge tax treaty shopping.238
Indeed, the limited scope of beneficial ownership as an anti-abuse concept is 
suggested by the fifth revision to the commentary, which emphasizes that treaty 
benefits under article 10, 11, or 12 need not “automatically be granted” under these 
provisions even if the recipient of a dividend, interest, or royalty payment is a bene-
ficial owner of the payment.239 On the contrary, the revised text of the commentary 
states:
Whilst the concept of “beneficial owner” deals with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e. 
those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend 
to someone else), it does not deal with other cases of abuses, such as certain forms of 
treaty shopping . . . and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way 
the application of other approaches to addressing such cases.240
As the current version of the OECD commentary confirms, these “other approaches” 
to address tax-treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements include LOB provisions 
and the PPT.241 The use of such measures in tax treaties is discussed in the text that 
follows.
Treaty-Based Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules
A more targeted approach to tax treaty shopping involves the negotiation of specific 
anti-avoidance rules to be included in tax treaties. In order to discourage tax-
motivated emigration, for example, tax treaties may include provisions permitting 
source taxation of capital gains from the alienation of property by former residents, 
Indofood were “very extreme” since Newco “would have had no function other than to receive 
and pay on interest.” Baker, supra note 163, at 32.
 236 Prévost Car, supra note 160.
 237 Supra note 194.
 238 See, for example, Danon, supra note 230, at 35, concluding that “beneficial ownership is of 
very limited use in conduit situations.”
 239 Paragraph 12.5 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.3 of the commentary on 
article 11, and paragraph 4.4 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
 240 Ibid.
 241 Ibid., referring to article 29 of the OECD model convention, which includes the framework for 
a LOB provision and the PPT.
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which often supplement domestic exit tax provisions.242 In order to discourage the 
use of conduit arrangements, tax treaties may include one or more of the following 
measures:
n “lookthrough” provisions that deny treaty benefits to a company resident in 
a contracting state to the extent that the company is not owned directly or 
indirectly by residents of that state;243
n “exclusion” provisions denying treaty benefits to companies enjoying special 
tax privileges;244
 242 See, for example, article 13(9) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, which preserves “the right of a 
Contracting State to levy according to its law a tax on or in respect of gains from the alienation 
of any property on a person who is a resident of that State at any time during the fiscal year in 
which the property is alienated, or has been so resident at any time during the six years 
immediately preceding the alienation of the property.” Convention Between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at London on September 8, 1978, as amended by 
the protocols signed on April 15, 1980, October 16, 1985, May 7, 2003, and July 21, 2014.
 243 See, for example, article 2 of the protocol to the Belgium-Spain tax treaty (Convention 
Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Spain for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and Tax Frauds with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital, signed at Brussels on June 14, 1995, with protocol), which provides, 
“notwithstanding the provisions of Arts. 10-13, that the source State shall not provide relief if 
dividends, interest, royalties or capital gains are derived by a company which is a resident of the 
other Contracting State, where persons who are not residents of that other State hold, directly 
or indirectly, more than 50% of the capital of that company.” De Broe, supra note 18, at 736. 
These provisions (which appear to be based, in part, on the German anti-treaty-shopping 
provision discussed above in the text accompanying note 28) are discussed in the OECD 
conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraphs 23-24, and were incorporated into 
paragraph 14 of the commentary on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model 
convention (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, July 23, 1992)). That paragraph was deleted from the 
OECD commentary in 2017.
 244 See, for example, article 26(3) of Canada-Finland tax treaty, which excludes from the 
application of the treaty “any company, trust or other entity that is a resident of a Contracting 
State and is beneficially owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons 
who are not residents of that State, if the amount of the tax imposed on the income or capital 
of the company, trust or other entity by that State (after taking into account any reduction or 
offset of the amount of tax in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contribution, 
credit or allowance to the company, trust, or other entity or to any other person) is substantially 
lower than the amount that would be imposed by that State if all of the shares of the capital 
stock of the company or all of the interests in the trust or other entity, as the case may be, were 
beneficially owned by one or more individuals who were residents of that State.” Convention 
Between Canada and Finland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Helsinki on July 20, 2006. This 
“exclusion approach” is discussed in the OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at 
paragraphs 26-28, and was incorporated into paragraphs 21-21.2 of the commentary on 
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n “subject-to-tax” provisions that grant source-state treaty benefits only for 
income that is subject to tax in the residence state;245
n “channel” provisions that deny treaty benefits for income received by a com-
pany resident in the other contracting state that is used primarily to satisfy 
claims of one or more persons not resident in that state who have a substantial 
interest in the company and exercise control of the company;246
n detailed LOB provisions that limit treaty benefits to specific persons or cat-
egories of income;247 and
n purpose tests that deny some or all treaty benefits where the main purpose or 
one of the main purposes of the transaction or arrangement that would other-
wise result in a treaty benefit was to obtain the benefit.248
article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention, supra note 243. A greatly 
expanded discussion of tax treaty provisions to address “special tax regimes” now appears in 
paragraphs 85-100 of the 2017 OECD commentary.
 245 See, for example, article 27(2) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242, which limits treaty 
relief for persons subject to tax on a remittance basis “only to so much of the income as is taxed 
in the other Contracting State.” Another example of this subject-to-tax approach is found in 
anti-abuse rules for income attributed to a permanent establishment in a low-tax jurisdiction 
that is exempt from tax in the residence state. See, for example, article 29(8) of the Convention 
Between Canada and France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Paris on May 2, 
1975, as amended by the protocols signed on January 16, 1987, November 30, 1995, and 
February 2, 2010; and article 10 of the MLI, which will be discussed in the second part of this 
article. This “subject-to-tax” approach was discussed in the OECD conduit companies report, 
supra note 18, at paragraphs 29-36, and incorporated into paragraphs 15-16 of the commentary 
on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention, supra note 243. These 
paragraphs were deleted from the OECD commentary in 2017.
 246 See, for example, article 22 of the Belgium-Switzerland tax treaty, which incorporates the Swiss 
anti-abuse decree discussed above in the text accompanying note 28 (Convention Between the 
Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed at Bern on August 28, 1978). See De Broe, 
supra note 18, at 732-34. This “channel” approach was discussed in the OECD conduit 
companies report, supra note 18, at paragraphs 37-41, and was incorporated into paragraphs 
17-18 of the commentary on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention, 
supra note 243. These paragraphs were deleted from the OECD commentary in 2017.
 247 See, for example, article XXIX A of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48. A discussion of 
this approach to tax treaty shopping was first added in paragraph 20 of the commentary on 
article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. With the addition of a detailed 
LOB provision to the OECD model convention in 2017, that discussion was deleted from the 
commentary on article 1 and replaced with commentary on new article 29.
 248 See, for example, articles 10(8), 11(9), and 12(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242. 
A discussion of this approach to tax treaty shopping was first added in paragraph 21.4 of the 
commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. With the 
addition of the PPT to the OECD model convention in 2017, that discussion was deleted from 
the commentary on article 1 and replaced with commentary on new article 29(9).
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Although these specific anti-avoidance rules appear in many tax treaties,249 the 
most important of these provisions in the context of the MLI and the PPT are detailed 
LOB provisions and purpose tests. The former form the basis for the “simplified 
limitation-on-benefit” (SLOB) provisions in articles 7(8) through (13) of the MLI and 
the framework for detailed LOB provisions in articles 29(1) through (7) of the 2017 
OECD model convention; the latter are incorporated into the PPT in article 7(1) of 
the MLI and article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD model convention, which applies in 
place of or in the absence of these purpose tests in CTAs.
Detailed LOB Provisions
First included in the OECD commentary in 2003250 and added to the OECD model 
convention in 2017,251 detailed LOB provisions were originally developed in the 
United States, which has had policy concerns about tax treaty shopping dating back 
to at least the 1980s.252 Although early versions of these LOB provisions contained 
relatively simple lookthrough elements as well as purpose tests,253 the provisions 
became more detailed over time as US treaty negotiators devised a growing number 
of objective criteria to preclude treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements.254 
The 1989 US-Germany tax treaty was the first US treaty to contain a detailed LOB 
provision.255 Since then, the United States has generally insisted on including a 
detailed LOB provision in all its tax treaties.256 These LOB provisions usually operate 
on a reciprocal basis; however, the provision that was added to the Canada-US tax 
treaty by the third protocol in 1995 initially applied only to US treaty benefits, and 
was extended to Canadian treaty benefits only after the signing of the fifth protocol 
in 2007.
 249 For a brief summary of International Fiscal Association branch reports on specific anti-
avoidance provisions in tax treaties, see van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 47-53.
 250 Paragraph 20 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
 251 Articles 29(1) through (7) of the OECD model convention.
 252 Anna A. Kornikova, “Solving the Problem of Tax-Treaty Shopping Through the Use of 
Limitation on Benefit Provisions” (2008) 8:2 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 
249-86, at 279.
 253 Ibid., at 279-80. See also the discussion of early US approaches in Rosenbloom, supra note 15, 
at 779-810.
 254 Patricia A. Brown, “Policy Forum: What Makes a Dutch Company Dutch? The Evolution of 
US Limitation-on-Benefit Provisions” (2014) 62:3 Canadian Tax Journal 741-52.
 255 Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, signed at Bonn on August 29, 1989 
(herein referred to as “the US-Germany tax treaty”), article 28. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and 
Christiana Hji Panayi, “Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union,” in Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges Between Law and Economics, supra note 108, 21-50, at 42.
 256 J. Clifton Fleming Jr., “Searching for the Uncertain Rationale Underlying the US Treasury’s 
Anti-Treaty Shopping Policy” (2012) 40:4 Intertax 245-53.
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Even though most US tax treaties concluded since the early 1990s contain detailed 
LOB provisions, it was only in 2006 that these provisions were added to the US model 
income tax convention.257 The more recent 2016 US model income tax convention 
contains even more detailed LOB provisions that expand upon the provisions in the 
2006 model convention.258 Although the final report on BEPS action 6 was com-
pleted before the final 2016 model convention was released, the LOB provisions in 
the 2016 model form the basis for the SLOB provisions in the MLI and the framework 
for detailed LOB provisions in articles 29(1) through (7) of the 2017 OECD model 
convention. In general terms, these provisions limit treaty benefits to specific 
types of persons resident in a contracting state and specific kinds of income received 
by residents of a contracting state.
Beginning with article 22(1) of the 2016 US model convention, the first limitation 
on treaty benefits provides that these benefits are, except as otherwise provided in 
article 22 and a few other treaty provisions, granted only to residents of a contracting 
state who are “qualified person[s].”259 For this purpose, article 22(2) generally defines 
a qualified person as
 1. an individual;260
 2. a contracting state or political subdivision or local authority;261
 3. a company if the principal class of its shares (and any disproportionate class) 
is regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges, and either its 
principal class of shares is primarily traded on more or more recognized 
stock exchanges of the contracting state of which it is a resident, or its primary 
place of management and control is in the contracting state of which it is a 
resident;262
 257 United States, Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of 
November 15, 2006, at article 22 (herein referred to as “the 2006 US model convention”) 
(www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf ).
 258 United States, Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention, 
February 17, 2016, at article 22 (herein referred to as “the 2016 US model convention”) (www 
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-us%20Model-2016.pdf ).
 259 Ibid., at article 22(1).
 260 Ibid., at article 22(2)(a).
 261 Ibid., at article 22(2)(b).
 262 Ibid., at article 22(2)(c). The term “principal class of shares” is generally defined as “the 
ordinary or common shares of the company” provided that the class represents a majority of 
the company’s aggregate votes and value. Ibid., at article 22(7)(b). The term “disproportionate 
class of shares” is generally defined as “any class of shares of a company, or in the case of a 
trust, any class of beneficial interests in such trust, resident in one of the Contracting States 
that entitles the shareholder to disproportionately higher participation, through dividends, 
redemption payments or otherwise, in the earnings generated in the other Contracting State.” 
Ibid., at article 22(7)(c).
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 4. a company that satisfies a two-part ownership and base erosion test, gener-
ally requiring that
a. at least 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of its shares (and any 
disproportionate class) is owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer 
companies entitled to benefits under category (3),263 and
b. less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income is paid, directly or 
indirectly, in the form of deductible payments to persons other than quali-
fied persons under category (1), (2), (3), or (5), or connected persons 
benefiting from a special tax regime or notional deductions;264
 5. a pension fund or charitable organization, provided that in the case of a pen-
sion fund operated to administer pension or retirement benefits, more than 
50 percent of its beneficiaries, members, or participants are resident in either 
contracting state, and in the case of a pension fund operated to earn income 
for an exempt entity that administers pension or retirement benefits, the 
earnings benefit exclusively or almost exclusively pension funds more than 
50 percent of the beneficiaries, members, or participants of which are resident 
in either contracting state;265 or
 6. a person other than an individual that satisfies a two-part ownership and base 
erosion test generally requiring that
a. shares or other beneficial interests (including any disproportionate class) 
representing at least 50 percent of the aggregate votes and value of the 
shares or beneficial interests are owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified 
persons of the contracting state under category (1), (2), (3), or (5),266 and
b. less than 50 percent of the person’s gross income for the taxable year is 
paid, directly or indirectly, in the form of deductible payments to persons 
other than qualified persons under category (1), (2), (3), or (5), or connected 
persons benefiting from a special tax regime or notional deductions.267
Incorporating lookthrough elements in categories 4, 5, and 6, and a channel approach 
in the form of the base erosion tests in categories 4 and 6, this provision is designed 
to limit treaty benefits to residents of a contracting state with a substantive eco-
nomic connection to that state.268
 263 Ibid., at article 22(2)(d)(i). Where ownership is indirect, the provision also requires each 
intermediate owner to be a resident of the contracting state from which the benefit is being 
sought, or a “qualifying intermediate owner” as defined in article 22(7)(f ), ibid.
 264 Ibid., at article 22(2)(d)(i).
 265 Ibid., at article 22(2)(e). Where ownership is indirect, the provision also requires each 
intermediate owner to be a “qualified intermediate owner” as defined in article 7(f ).
 266 Ibid., at article 22(2)(f )(i).
 267 Ibid., at article 22(2)(f )(ii).
 268 Kornikova, supra note 252, at 281, referring to comparable provisions in the 2006 US model 
convention.
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In addition to these provisions, article 22(3) grants treaty benefits for items of 
income that are derived by a resident of a contracting state from the other state if 
the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the first state 
and the income derived from the other state emanates from or is incidental to that 
trade or business.269 Article 22(5) further extends treaty benefits to dividends and 
interest paid by members of a multinational corporate group to a company resident 
in a contracting state “that functions as a headquarters company for a multinational 
corporate group.”270 Thus, through these provisions as well, the US LOB provisions 
extend specific treaty benefits to residents with a significant economic connection 
with a contracting state, even if they are not qualified persons.
Finally, the 2016 US model convention includes two other provisions that also 
grant treaty benefits to residents other than qualified persons. The first is a deriva-
tive benefits provision, which grants treaty benefits to a company at least 95 percent 
of the aggregate votes and value of which is owned by seven or fewer persons who 
are “equivalent beneficiaries” entitled to the same or more advantageous treaty 
benefits under a tax treaty between their state and the source state, provided that 
less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income is paid in the form of deductible 
payments to persons who are not equivalent beneficiaries or persons who are 
equivalent beneficiaries under specific circumstances.271 The second provision 
allows the competent authority of a contracting state to grant treaty benefits to a 
resident of the other state either generally or with respect to a specific item of 
income, “taking into account the object and purpose of this Convention,” if the 
resident “demonstrates to the satisfaction of such competent authority a substantial 
nontax nexus to its Contracting State of residence and that neither its establish-
ment, acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct of its operations had as one of 
its principal purposes the obtaining of benefits under this Convention.”272 Since the 
first of these provisions grants treaty benefits to an entity if the same or more 
advantageous treaty benefits would be available to its owners or most recipients of 
deductible payments under another tax treaty, and the second provision grants 
treaty benefits where the resident demonstrates a “substantial nontax nexus” to the 
residence state and also demonstrates that one of the principal purposes of its estab-
lishment, acquisition, or maintenance was not to obtain benefits under the 
 269 2016 US model convention, supra note 258, at article 22(3)(a). Where the resident of one 
contracting state derives an item of income from a trade or business activity conducted by the 
resident in the other state, or derives an item of income arising in the other state from a related 
person, article 22(3)(b) further provides that the test in article 22(3)(a) is considered to be 
satisfied with respect to the item of income “only if the trade or business activity carried on by 
the resident in the first-mentioned Contracting State is substantial in relation to the trade or 
business activity carried on by the resident or such person in the other Contracting State.”
 270 Ibid., at article 22(5).
 271 Ibid., at article 22(4).
 272 Ibid., at article 22(6).
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convention, these provisions extend treaty benefits to circumstances in which en-
titlement to these benefits does not result from abusive tax treaty shopping.
Purpose Tests
In addition to, or instead of, detailed LOB provisions, many tax treaties include pur-
pose tests that deny some or all treaty benefits where “the main purpose or one of 
the main purposes” of the transaction or arrangement that would otherwise result 
in a treaty benefit was to obtain that benefit. Although subjective intention-based 
anti-abuse provisions were included in the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty and the 1945 
UK-US tax treaty as a way to limit entitlement to the lower withholding tax rate on 
dividends paid to a parent corporation,273 the words “the main purpose or one of the 
main purposes” appear to have originated in the United Kingdom, where the same 
language is used in many domestic anti-avoidance provisions.274
Beginning in the late 1960s, several UK tax treaties began to include provisions 
denying reduced withholding tax rates under interest and royalty articles if the debt 
claim or right in respect of which the interest or royalty was paid “was created or 
assigned mainly for the purposes of taking advantage of this article and not for 
bona fide commercial purposes.”275 In the 1992 UK-Guyana tax treaty, this language 
was modified to deny treaty benefits under these articles if “the main purpose or 
one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment” 
of the debt-claim or right in respect of which the interest or royalty was paid was 
“to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.”276 As a 
result, these provisions dropped the “bona fide commercial purposes” test, lowered 
the purpose threshold to include transactions or arrangements where “one of the 
main purposes” was to obtain the reduced withholding tax rate, and expanded 
the scope of the purpose inquiry to encompass “any person concerned with the 
creation or assignment” of the debt-claim or right.277
Subsequent UK tax treaties have generally included these limitations in interest 
and royalty articles and occasionally in the “other income” article,278 and the OECD 
 273 According to article XI(2) of the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 125, the lower 
5 percent withholding tax rate (as opposed to 15 percent) was not available if “the competent 
authority” of the source state was “satisfied that the corporate relationship between the two 
corporations has been arranged or is maintained primarily with the intention of taking 
advantage of this paragraph.” Similar language appears in article VI of the 1945 UK-US tax 
treaty, supra note 126. See Vann, supra note 92, at 271, and Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 779.
 274 Jonathan Schwarz, Schwarz on Tax Treaties, 3d ed. (London: Wolters Kluwer, 2013), at 421.
 275 Ibid., at 415.
 276 Articles 12(9) and 13(7) of the Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Co-operative Republic of 
Guyana for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at Georgetown on August 31, 1992.
 277 Schwarz, supra note 274, at 421.
 278 Ibid., speculating that inclusion in the “other income” article was designed to address derivative 
financial instruments, which can replicate other types of income.
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adopted identical language in its 2003 revisions to the OECD commentary.279 Since 
the mid-1990s, similar provisions have also been included in the tax treaties of many 
other countries, mostly in interest and royalty articles,280 but also in articles dealing 
with dividends281 and capital gains,282 and sometimes in separate provisions limiting 
treaty benefits to different categories of income.283 In addition to these provisions, 
which apply only to specific categories of income, a comprehensive purpose provi-
sion was included in the 2012 protocol to the India-UK tax treaty, stipulating that
 279 Paragraph 21.4 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99, suggesting that this anti-abuse provision could be used to deal with source taxation of 
dividends, interest, royalties, and other income.
 280 See, for example, Canada’s tax treaties with Chile (Convention Between Canada and the 
Republic of Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Santiago on January 21, 1998) and 
Ukraine (Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ukraine for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and on Capital, signed at Kiev on March 4, 1996).
 281 See, for example, Canada’s tax treaties with Hong Kong (Agreement Between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Hong Kong on November 11, 2012); 
Israel (Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State 
of Israel for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at New York on September 21, 2016); Mexico (Convention 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, signed at Mexico City on September 12, 2006); New Zealand (Convention Between 
Canada and New Zealand for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Wellington on May 3, 2012); and Poland 
(Convention Between Canada and the Republic of Poland for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at 
Ottawa on May 14, 2012).
 282 See, for example, article 13(7) of the Canada-Israel tax treaty, supra note 281.
 283 See, for example, article 26(1) of the Canada-Colombia tax treaty (Convention Between 
Canada and the Republic of Colombia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Lima 
on November 21, 2008), which denies treaty benefits under the dividend, interest, and royalty 
articles if “the purpose or one of the main purposes of any person in relation to the creation or 
assignment of a share, a debt-claim, or a right with respect to which dividends, interest or 
royalties are paid, was to derive benefits from one or more of those Articles through such 
creation or assignment”; and article 23(2) of the Spain-UK tax treaty (Convention Between the 
Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital, signed at London on March 14, 2013), which denies “relief . . . under 
this Convention” if “the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned 
with the creation, assignment or alienation of any shares, debt-claims, assets or other rights in 
respect of which income or gains arise was to take advantage of this Convention by means of 
that creation, assignment or alienation.”
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[b]enefits of this Convention shall not be available to a resident of a Contracting State, 
or with respect to any transaction undertaken by such a resident, if the main purpose or 
one of the main purposes of the creation or existence of such a resident or of the trans-
action undertaken by him, was to obtain benefits under this Convention.284
Together with the OECD’s guiding principle discussed earlier,285 this generalized 
purpose test is an obvious antecedent to the PPT in article 7(1) of the MLI and arti-
cle 29(9) of the 2017 OECD model convention.
Other Treat y Abuses
In addition to tax treaty shopping, other transactions or arrangements may result in 
tax treaty abuse where they enable persons either to obtain benefits under particular 
treaty provisions in a manner that contradicts the object and purpose of these pro-
visions or the treaty as a whole, or to circumvent the application of other treaty 
provisions in a manner that contradicts their object and purpose. Examples of these 
transactions or arrangements include the following:
n “surplus-stripping” transactions that convert dividends that would otherwise 
be subject to withholding tax under provisions comparable to article 10 of the 
OECD model convention into gains from the alienation of shares that are 
exempt from taxation in the state in which the company is resident under 
provisions comparable to article 13 of the OECD model convention;286
n “hiring-out of labour” arrangements that divert employment income that 
would otherwise be paid by an employer resident in the state in which the 
employment is exercised into service fees paid to an employer resident in 
another state, in order to convert employment income that would otherwise 
be subject to tax in the state in which the employment is exercised under 
provisions comparable to article 15(1) of the OECD model convention into 
 284 Article 28C(1) of the Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital Gains, signed at New Delhi on January 25, 1993, added by article IX of the amending 
protocol of October 30, 2012. In Canada, the federal government proposed a similarly 
comprehensive purpose-based anti-abuse provision in 2013, which would have applied as a 
domestic override of all Canadian tax treaties. Canada, Department of Finance, Consultation 
Paper on Treaty Shopping—The Problem and Possible Solutions (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 
August 2013) (www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/ts-cf-eng.asp#a1). The government withdrew the 
proposal in August 2014, choosing to await the outcome of BEPS action 6 before proceeding 
further. For a critical assessment of the proposal, arguing among other things that it was 
inconsistent with Canada’s tax treaty obligations, see Ken Snider, “Policy Forum: Canada’s 
Anti-Treaty-Shopping Proposals and International Treaty Obligations” (2014) 62:3 Canadian 
Tax Journal 705-28.
 285 See supra notes 101-106 and the accompanying text.
 286 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at 
paragraphs 61-64.
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employment income that is exempt tax from tax in the state in which the em-
ployment is exercised under provisions comparable to article 15(2) of the 
OECD model convention;287
n transactions or arrangements that divert income that would otherwise be paid 
to an entertainer or sportsperson in respect of personal activities exercised in 
one state to a “star company” resident in a contracting state that does not 
have a permanent establishment in the state in which these activities are 
exercised, in order to convert income that would otherwise be subject to tax 
in the state in which the activities are exercised under provisions comparable 
to article 17(1) of the OECD model convention into income that would be 
exempt from tax in that state under provisions comparable to article 7 of the 
OECD model convention if the treaty did not include a star company provi-
sion like article 17(2) of the OECD model convention;288
n indirect ownership of immovable property situated in a state in order to 
convert gains from the alienation of this property that would otherwise be 
taxable in that state under provisions comparable to article 13(1) of the OECD 
model convention into gains from the alienation of shares or other interests 
that would be exempt from tax in that state under provisions comparable 
to article 13(5) if the article did not include a substituted property rule like 
article 13(4) of the OECD model convention;289
n transactions or arrangements that convert dividends that would otherwise be 
subject to withholding tax at the high rate under provisions comparable to 
article 10(2)(b) of the OECD model convention into dividends that qualify for 
the low treaty rate under provisions comparable to article 10(2)(a) of the 
OECD model convention on dividends paid by a subsidiary to its parent com-
pany;290 and
n transactions that dilute the proportion of an entity’s value attributable to 
immovable property situated in a state in order to convert gains that would 
otherwise be subject to tax in that state under a substituted property rule into 
gains that are exempt from tax in the state in which the immovable property 
is situated under provisions comparable to article 13(5) of the OECD model 
convention.291
Since these kinds of transactions or arrangements may be undertaken by persons 
who are already residents of a contracting state in order to access benefits under a 
 287 Paragraphs 8.2-8.28 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
 288 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at 
paragraphs 54-57.
 289 Ibid., at paragraphs 59-60.
 290 Ibid., at paragraphs 68-69.
 291 Ibid., at paragraphs 74-75.
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specific provision of a tax treaty entered into by that state, they are often labelled 
“rule shopping” as opposed to “treaty shopping.”292
Unlike objections to tax treaty shopping, which address the objects and purposes 
of tax treaties as a whole,293 objections to treaty rule shopping emphasize the objects 
and purposes of specific treaty provisions themselves, which may be undermined by 
transactions and arrangements that qualify for benefits under a specific provision 
or circumvent the application of a less advantageous provision in a manner con-
trary to the object and purpose of these provisions.294 Where an entertainer or 
sportsperson diverts income from personal activities exercised in one state to a star 
company resident in another state in order to avoid a treaty provision that would 
otherwise allow this income to be taxed in the state in which the activities are exer-
cised, for example, this diversion circumvents the application of the treaty provision 
in a way that may defeat its underlying object or purpose of allowing the state in 
which these activities are exercised to tax the income from these activities. Likewise, 
where the incorporation of immovable property situated in one state allows a person 
resident in another state to avoid a treaty provision that would otherwise allow the 
first state to tax gains from the alienation of the property, the incorporation and 
alienation of shares circumvents the application of the treaty provision in a way that 
may defeat its underlying object or purpose of allowing the state in which immov-
able property is situated to tax gains from the alienation of such property. Moreover, 
to the extent that these and other rule-shopping transactions or arrangements facili-
tate unintended non-taxation or reduced taxation, treaty rule shopping raises the 
same concerns as tax treaty shopping.295
As with tax treaty shopping, states have relied on domestic anti-avoidance 
doctrines and rules as well as treaty-based anti-avoidance rules to counteract many 
of these rule-shopping transactions or arrangements. In order to deny treaty benefits 
that could otherwise be available through surplus-stripping transactions that convert 
dividends into gains from the alienation of shares, for example, some states have 
relied on domestic anti-avoidance doctrines while others have introduced specific 
statutory anti-avoidance rules that recharacterize proceeds from certain share trans-
actions as dividends.296 Although it might be argued that these domestic 
 292 See, for example, Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation 
Treaties: A Spanish Perspective—Part I” (2002) 56:11 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 542-53, at 543; De Broe, supra note 18, at 10; and Danon and Salomé, supra 
note 2, at 214.
 293 See supra notes 19-23 and the accompanying text.
 294 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 69.
 295 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at 
paragraph 32.
 296 In the Netherlands, for example, the tax authorities have sought to rely on the fraus legis 
(abuse-of-law) doctrine, apparently without success. De Broe, supra note 18, at 407-9. In 
Canada, on the other hand, cross-border surplus-stripping transactions are subject to a specific 
statutory anti-avoidance rule in section 212.1 of the Income Tax Act.
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anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules contradict tax treaty 
obligations,297 the OECD takes the position that these doctrines and rules do not 
conflict with tax treaty obligations to the extent that they determine the character-
ization of transactions and arrangements to which tax treaties apply.298 The Tax 
Court of Canada took a similar view in a case involving a cross-border surplus-
stripping transaction, concluding that it would be
a surprising conclusion that Canada, or indeed any of the other countries with which 
it has tax treaties . . . had intentionally or inadvertently bargained away its right to deal 
with tax avoidance or tax evasion by residents of treaty countries in its own domestic 
tax laws . . . [and] equally surprising if tax avoidance schemes that are susceptible of 
attack under either general anti-avoidance provisions or specific anti-avoidance rules, 
if carried out by Canadian residents, could be perpetuated with impunity by non-
residents under the protection of a treaty.299
Likewise for hiring-out of labour arrangements, the OECD commentary notes 
that “many States” have developed “various legislative or jurisprudential rules and 
criteria” in order to distinguish “cases where services rendered by an individual to 
an enterprise should be considered to be rendered in an employment relationship 
(contract of service) from cases where such services should be considered to be 
rendered under a contract for the provision of services between two separate enter-
prises (contract for services).”300 In addition, the commentary explains:
 297 This appears to have been the basis for decisions in the Netherlands in which the courts 
rejected the argument that capital gains should be recharacterized as dividends.
 298 Paragraphs 73 and 76-80 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention. For 
an exhaustive analysis of the relationship between domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax 
treaties, see Jinyan Li and Daniel Sandler, “The Relationship Between Domestic Anti-
Avoidance Legislation and Tax Treaties” (1997) 45:5 Canadian Tax Journal 891-958.
 299 RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al. v. The Queen, 97 DTC 302, at paragraph 56 (TCC). The 
court’s conclusion that section 212.1 of the Income Tax Act did not conflict with provisions of 
the Canada-US tax treaty also turned on the text of article X(3) of that treaty, which defines a 
dividend to include “income that is subjected to the same treatment as income from shares 
under the laws of the State in which the payer is a resident.” For a useful discussion of the case 
in the context of OECD commentaries on the relationship between tax treaties and domestic 
anti-avoidance rules, see Arnold, supra note 107, at 249-52.
 300 Paragraph 8.4 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention. In the event 
that states have not adopted such legislative or jurisprudential rules, the commentary 
explains that states are free to adopt bilaterally a provision along the following lines:
 Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to remuneration derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State in respect of an employment exercised in the other Contracting State 
and paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of that other State if:
a) the recipient renders services in the course of that employment to a person other 
than the employer and that person, directly or indirectly, supervises, directs or controls 
the manner in which those services are performed; and
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[E]ven where the domestic law of the State that applies the Convention does not offer 
the possibility of questioning a formal contractual relationship and therefore does not 
allow the State to consider that services rendered to a local enterprise by an individual 
who is formally employed by a non-resident are rendered in an employment relation-
ship (contract of service) with that local enterprise, that State may deny the application 
of the exception [in article 15(2)] in abusive cases.301
As a result, the commentary concludes, these transactions or arrangements may be 
challenged either under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines or statutory general 
anti-avoidance rules, or as an abuse of the convention itself.302
In order to address the diversion of income to star companies, on the other hand, 
the OECD model convention was amended in 1977 to allow states in which personal 
activities are exercised by an entertainer or sportsperson to tax income in respect of 
those activities that accrues to a person other than the entertainer or sportsperson.303 
As the OECD commentary explains, this provision allows states whose domestic law 
does not allow them to look through these arrangements “to impose a tax on the 
profits diverted from the income of the entertainer or sportsperson to the enter-
prise.”304 In the years since 1977, a corresponding star company provision has been 
added to many bilateral tax treaties.305
The OECD model convention was also amended to eliminate treaty benefits that 
could otherwise be obtained through indirect ownership of immovable property, by 
adding a provision that extends source-state jurisdiction to gains derived by a resi-
dent of a contracting state from the alienation of shares “deriving more than 50 per 
cent of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in the 
other Contracting State.”306 Based on an earlier provision in the 1980 UN model 
b) those services constitute an integral part of the business activities carried on by 
that person.
Paragraph 8.3 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
 301 Paragraph 8.8 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
 302 This conclusion was clear from paragraph 8.9 of the commentary on article 15, which 
specifically referred to paragraph 9.4 of the commentary on article 1. These paragraphs were 
deleted with the 2017 revisions to the commentary. For a useful discussion of the commentaries 
on article 15, see Luc De Broe and Katrina Petrosovitch, “The Concepts of ‘Employment’ and 
‘Employer’ Under Article 15 of the OECD Model Convention,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A 
Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88, 207-38.
 303 Article 17(2) of the OECD model convention.
 304 Paragraph 11(c) of the commentary on article 17 of the OECD model convention. For a useful 
review of this provision, see Dick Molenaar and Harald Grams, “Rent-a-Star—The Purpose of 
Article 17(2) of the OECD Model” (2002) 56:10 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
500-9.
 305 See, for example, article XVI(2) of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48.
 306 Article 13(4) of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. As will be explained in the 
second part of this article, this provision was amended following BEPS action 6 to also include 
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convention307 and consistent with prior treaty practice of many states, including 
Canada,308 the obvious purpose of this provision is “to prevent the avoidance of 
taxes on the gains from the sale of immovable property,” which would otherwise be 
“relatively easy to avoid . . . through the incorporation of a company to hold such 
property.”309 As with the star company rule, this “substituted property rule” has also 
been added to many bilateral tax treaties.310
Treaty-based specific anti-avoidance provisions have also been relied on to ensure 
that the reduced withholding tax rate on dividends paid by a subsidiary to a parent 
company is available only if the subsidiary is a “real subsidiary” that “was genuinely 
owned long term by the parent.”311 As explained earlier,312 the dividend article in 
the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty included anti-abuse language denying the lower 
withholding tax rate where the relationship between the two corporations “has been 
arranged and is maintained primarily with the intention of taking advantage of this 
paragraph.”313 This provision is a clear antecedent to contemporary purpose tests 
that deny all benefits under the dividend articles of tax treaties if
it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the 
creation or assignment of the shares or other rights in respect of which the dividend is 
paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.314
gains from the alienation of other interests deriving their value primarily from immovable 
property, and to apply where this proportionate value threshold is met at “any time during the 
365 days preceding the alienation” of the shares or comparable interests. These amendments 
are also included in article 9(1) of the MLI.
 307 United Nations, Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries 
(New York: United Nations, 1980), article 13(4). For a detailed discussion of the capital gains 
article in model tax conventions, see David W. Smith, “Model Conventions and the Capital 
Gains Article,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88, 147-205, 
at 181.
 308 Luca Taglialatela, “Treaty Abuse and Passive Income: Holding Period for Intercompany 
Dividends and Modifications to Article 13 Para. 4 OECD MC,” in Daniel W. Blum and 
Markus Seiler, eds., Preventing Treaty Abuse (Vienna: Linde, 2016), 463-98, at 489-90.
 309 United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and 
Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011), paragraph 8 of the commentary on 
article 13.
 310 For a list of Canada’s tax treaties with and without this rule, see David N. Finkelstein and 
Ronald K. Durand, “The Substituted Property Rule in Article 13 of the OECD and UN 
Model Tax Conventions,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88, 
103-45, at 132-42.
 311 Vann, supra note 92, at 271-72.
 312 See supra note 273 and the accompanying text.
 313 Article XI(2) of the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 125. Similar language appeared in 
article VI of the 1945 UK-US tax treaty, supra note 273.
 314 See, for example, article 10(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242.
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Although these provisions may be used to challenge tax-treaty-shopping transactions 
or arrangements, they may also be used to challenge rule-shopping transactions or 
arrangements undertaken to obtain a reduced withholding tax rate on dividends 
paid by a subsidiary to a parent company.315 Even without these specific anti-
avoidance provisions, however, the OECD commentary has taken the position that 
the reduced withholding tax rate under the dividend article “should not be granted 
in cases of the abuse of the provision”—for example, where a company increases its 
shareholding “shortly before . . . dividends become payable . . . primarily for the 
purpose of securing” the low withholding tax rate, or “where the qualifying holding 
was arranged primarily in order to obtain the reduction.”316
In contrast to these measures to counteract treaty rule shopping, there appears 
to have been less concern, until recently, about transactions designed to circumvent 
the substituted property rules by diluting the proportion of an entity’s value attrib-
utable to immovable property prior to the alienation of shares or other interests. 
After these transactions were identified as a type of treaty abuse in the 2006 United 
Nations report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping,317 however, the UN model tax con-
vention was amended to include a provision extending source-state taxation to
[g]ains . . . derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of shares of 
a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State . . . if the alienator, at any 
time during the 12-month period preceding such alienation, held directly or indirectly 
at least ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations) 
of the capital of that company.318
As will be explained in more detail in the second part of this article, a similar anti-
abuse provision appears in article 9(1)(a) of the MLI, which has been incorporated 
into article 13(4) of the OECD model convention.
According to the final report on BEPS action 6, “targeted specific treaty anti-
abuse rules” such as these “generally provide greater certainty for both taxpayers 
and tax administrations” than general anti-abuse provisions like the PPT.319 What is 
less clear is the relationship between these specific anti-avoidance rules and a 
 315 In this circumstance, however, it appears that the effect of the rule is to deny all benefits under 
the dividend article, even including the higher withholding tax rate on dividends! As the second 
part of this article will explain, a similar result may occur under the PPT if it is not 
accompanied by a remedial provision like article 7(4) of the MLI.
 316 Paragraph 17 of the commentary on article 10 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra 
note 99. As will be explained in the second part of this article, concerns about this type of rule 
shopping underlie the anti-abuse provision in article 8(1) of the MLI, which was incorporated 
into article 10(2)(a) of the OECD model convention.
 317 Supra note 22.
 318 Article 13(5) of the UN model tax convention, supra note 309.
 319 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 27.
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general anti-abuse provision, and the extent to which a general anti-abuse provision 
like the PPT can be applied to rule-shopping transactions or arrangements that are 
not subject to a specific anti-abuse rule in a CTA. This and other issues concerning 
the MLI and the PPT will be taken up in the second part of this article, which will 
appear in a subsequent issue of this journal.

